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ployed despite his significant efforts to find a job.  
 
COMMENT 
PRESUMED GUILTY UNTIL PROVEN 
INNOCENT: CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE 
SECTION 851.8 AND THE INJUSTICE 
OF IMPOSING A FACTUAL INNOCENCE 
STANDARD ON ARRESTED PERSONS 
NATALIE LYONS* 
INTRODUCTION 
“Aren’t you that guy who was on the news?”  This was the standard 
response by myriad employers to job applications submitted by Kenny 
Woods, a twenty-two-year-old man from Haverford, Pennsylvania, after 
police erroneously accused him of the hit-and-run killing of Daniel 
Giletta.1   
“Before this happened, you run my name and . . . nothing, I was nobody.  
Now, I’m all over the Internet.”2  Nine months later, Mr. Woods, a father 
of two, remains unem 3
  * J.D., Golden Gate University School of Law, 2013; M.M., Vocal Performance, 
Northwestern University School of Music, 2003; B.A., English, Indiana University, 1998.  I would 
like to thank Alexandra Vesalga, Kyle Mabe, Dean Rachel Van Cleave, and Meredith Desautels of 
the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights for their mentorship and helpful advice on my inaugural 
effort at legal scholarship.  Finally, as ever, I am beholden to my family and dearest friends for their 
unceasing support.  
 1 Dana DiFilippo, His Reputation Is Still in Police Custody, PHILA. DAILY NEWS (July 14, 
2011), articles.philly.com/2011-07-14/news/29773582_1_wrongful-convictions-erroneous-arrests-
killer (noting that Mr. Woods “applied everywhere; hotels, the airport, mental health, SEPTA, auto-
body shops, [grocery and convenience] markets, [retail] stores”). 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
1
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Woods exemplifies the “crippling, long-lasting repercussions” faced 
by persons wrongfully accused of a crime.4  In California, an arrest 
remains on a person’s criminal record for her lifetime.5  Arrest records 
are not probative of guilt.6  Nonetheless, an arrest record can have 
persistent, damaging effects on an individual’s life.  The police may 
lawfully use a past arrest to support probable cause to re-arrest the 
person.7  California statutory provisions that forbid law enforcement 
agencies from disclosing arrest records to employers exempt several 
categories of employers from their purview.8  Moreover, those provisions 
fail to prevent commercial reporting agencies from unlawfully reporting 
arrest information on criminal background reports.9  These uses and 
misuses of the arrest record effectively sanction the notion that an 
arrestee should be deemed “suspicious”—a label that particularly 
impacts members of low-income, minority communities, who are 
arrested at greatly disproportionate rates.10 
 4 Id. 
 5 See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 13101-13103 (Westlaw 2013) (providing for the retention of 
criminal record information on a “nonerasable storage medium” and prohibiting the complete 
estruct ion). 
. Court, 553 P.2d 624, 628-29 (Cal. 1976) (noting several law enforcement 
ses of 
is 
censed
ging that background checks contain inaccurate information about criminal 
onvic
d ion of that informat
 6 See infra Part I. 
 7 Loder v. Mun
u arrest records). 
 8 See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.7(b) (Westlaw 2013) (providing that the protections do 
not inhibit disclosure of arrests to a government agency employing a peace officer); CAL. LAB. CODE 
§ 432.7(e) (Westlaw 2013) (providing that the protections do not apply to “persons seeking 
employment for positions in the Department of Justice or other criminal justice agencies”); CAL. 
LAB. CODE § 432.7(f) (Westlaw 2013) (authorizing a health facility employer to receive information 
on arrests for certain criminal offenses); CAL. PENAL CODE § 11105(m) (Westlaw 2013) (providing 
for disclosure of the full criminal record and any subsequent arrest records to an employer that 
li  as a community care facility, residential care facility for the elderly, or child care center). 
 9 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT ON CRIMINAL HISTORY 
BACKGROUND CHECKS 53-54 (2006), available at www.justice.gov/olp/ag_bgchecks_report.pdf 
(noting “problems with the accuracy and completeness of the records being disseminated from 
commercial databases”); Rebecca Oyama, Note, Do Not (Re)enter: The Rise of Criminal 
Background Tenant Screening as a Violation of the Fair Housing Act, 15 MICH. J. RACE & L. 181, 
188 (2009) (“Commercial criminal record databases and services . . . have been found to be rife with 
error and may report irrelevant arrest records or outdated convictions that have been expunged from 
an individual’s history.” (footnotes omitted)); Scott Michels, Advocates Complain of Background 
Check Errors, ABC NEWS (Oct. 13, 2008), abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=6017227&page=1#. 
TzS5C-S4KSp (“[A] review of court records by ABC News found dozens of lawsuits, on behalf of 
hundreds of people, filed in the last two years against the major criminal records database 
companies, alle
c tions.”). 
 10 Amy Solomon, Statement at the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
Meeting on Arrest and Conviction Records as a Barrier to Employment 3 (July 26, 2011), available 
at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/newsroom/testimony/2011/11_0726asolomon.pdf (noting that, although 
2
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In this context, the statutory remedy for removing an arrest from a 
person’s record places an undue burden upon a person who has never 
been found guilty of a crime.  California Penal Code section 851.8 
mandates that an arrested person prove her factual innocence before the 
arrest record may be sealed and destroyed.11 
This Comment examines the injustice of this section 851.8 
requirement that an arrested person prove her innocence before the arrest 
record will be destroyed.  Part I considers the probative value of an arrest 
record measured against its impact on the arrested person’s life, focusing 
on the disparate impact of arrests on marginalized communities of color.  
Part II examines the provisions of section 851.8 and the cases 
interpreting the factual innocence standard.  Part III challenges section 
851.8 under the Due Process Clause of the California Constitution and 
the procedural due process analysis provided by the State’s high court in 
People v. Ramirez.12  Finally, Part IV proposes a statutory revision in 
light of the recent shift in California criminal justice away from the 
“tough on crime” mentality, toward a more enlightened approach. 
I.  CALIFORNIA LAW SANCTIONS SEVERAL USES OF THE ARREST 
RECORD THAT PROMOTE THE ERRONEOUS BELIEF THAT AN ARREST 
IS PROBATIVE OF CRIMINAL CULPABILITY 
It is widely assumed that an arrested person, though not convicted 
of a crime, must be guilty of something.13  This assumption is 
problematic for several reasons.  First, the evidentiary standard for a 
lawful arrest falls far short of the evidence necessary to convict a person 
of a crime.14  This “fluid” standard15 undermines the argument that a 
person who triggers police suspicion is culpable of criminal activity.  
Although guilty persons are sometimes released or acquitted because the 
A -Americans account for less than 13% of the Ufrican .S. population, they account for 28% of all 
rrests)
ld, The Problem of the Innocent, Acquitted Defendant, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 
297, 1
ans less 
a . 
 11 CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8(b) (Westlaw 2013). 
 12 People v. Ramirez, 599 P.2d 622 (Cal. 1979). 
 13 Andrew D. Leipo
1 297 (2000) (stating that one of the “few things about the criminal justice system [that] 
command widespread agreement . . . is that most people who are arrested and charged with crimes 
are guilty of something.”). 
 14 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983) (“[T]he term ‘probable cause’ . . . me
than evidence which would justify condemnation.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. 339, 348 (1813) (Marshall, C.J.)). 
 15 People v. Thompson, 135 P.3d 3, 7 (Cal. 2006) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 232). 
3
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inst fostering a belief that guilt may be assumed by virtue of 
the a
an arrestee will be denied 
employment based on an arrest record.19 
A.   
RE, FAILS AS A UNIFORM 
MEASURE OF CRIMINAL CULPABILITY 
 
 
prosecution failed to meet its high burden of proof,16 it does not follow 
that all releases and acquittals result from the government’s inability to 
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  Proof of erroneous arrests, faulty 
evidence, and the disproportionate policing of certain communities 
caution aga
rrest. 
Yet, the California Legislature and courts have sanctioned uses of 
the arrest record that effectively legitimize the assumption that an arrest 
is probative of guilt.  Law enforcement agencies use arrest records to 
justify subsequent police questioning, detentions, and arrests.17  Many 
public employers and licensing agencies may lawfully consider arrest 
records in decisions regarding a person’s employment eligibility.18  
Moreover, substantial errors in reporting criminal record information 
greatly increase the likelihood that 
AN ARREST RECORD MAY REFLECT ERRONEOUS, UNLAWFUL, OR
BIASED POLICE ACTION AND, THEREFO
Even when the police act lawfully, the quantum of evidence 
sufficient to justify an arrest fails to provide sufficient basis to assume an 
arrestee’s culpability.20  Although probable cause for an arrest requires 
more than mere suspicion, the “more” equates to a requirement that the 
 16 Leipold, supra note 13, at 1299 (“[W]e strongly suspect that many defendants who are 
ause of the prosecutor’s high burden of 
roof, 
idad V., 261 Cal. Rptr. 39, 40 (Ct. App. 1989) (“There is a great difference 
etwee
 a reasonable doubt,’ and while an arrest 
ust st
acquitted were in fact guilty but were not convicted bec
p because of guileless jurors, or because of some other social values that conflict with the truth-
seeking function.”). 
 17 See discussion infra Part I.B.i. 
 18 See discussion infra Part I.B.ii. 
 19 See infra notes 104-117 and accompanying text. 
 20 People v. Hurtado, 52 P.3d 116, 121 (Cal. 2002) (“The term ‘probable cause’ has an 
established meaning in connection with criminal proceedings, and signifies a level of proof below 
that of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or even proof by a preponderance of the evidence.”); 
People v. Fischer, 317 P.2d 967, 970 (Cal. 1957) (“The test in such case is not whether the evidence 
upon which the officer made the arrest is sufficient to convict but only whether the prisoner should 
stand trial.”); In re Trin
b n the sufficiency of the evidence to justify an arrest and the evidence necessary for a 
conviction.”); see also Von Stein v. Brescher, 904 F.2d 572, 578 n.9 (11th Cir. 1990) (“‘Probable 
cause’ defines a radically different standard than ‘beyond
m and on more than suspicion, the arresting officer need not have in hand evidence sufficient to 
obtain a conviction.”). 
4
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caused by “[e]yewitness misidentification, unvalidated or improper 
 
suspicion be honest and reasonably formed.21  Probable cause to arrest 
“deals in probabilities and does not require a prima facie showing of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”22  “Room for doubt” may lawfully 
coexist with probable cause.23  The elasticity of this standard 
acknowledges that officers must make swift determination
ry appraisals of particular situations.24  Even when an officer relies 
on erroneous information to make the arrest, the arrest will be upheld if 
the officer acted in reasonable reliance on that information.25 
The frequency of erroneous arrests is difficult to establish, but their 
occurrence is undisputed.26  The advent of pre-conviction DNA testing 
has uncovered innumerable instances where police wrongfully charged 
an innocent person of a criminal offense.27  Erroneous arrests may be 
forensics, false confessions, lying snitches or informants, bad lawyering 
 
 21 People v. Kraft, 5 P.3d 68, 103 (Cal. 2000) (“Probable cause to arrest exists if facts known 
to the arresting officer would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to entertain an honest and 
strong suspicion that an individual is guilty of a crime.”). 
 22 People v. Boissard, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 738, 740 n.2 (Ct. App. 1992); see also Michigan v. 
“The validity of the arrest does not depend on whether the DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36 (1979) (
suspect actually committed a crime; the mere fact that the suspect is later acquitted of the offense for 
which he is arrested is irrelevant to the validity of the arrest. We have made clear that the kinds and 
degree of proof and the procedural requirements necessary for a conviction are not prerequisites to a 
valid arrest.”). 
 23 Fischer, 317 P.2d at 970. 
 24 See LAWRENCE TAYLOR & ROBERT TAYAC, CALIFORNIA DRUNK DRIVING DEFENSE § 
10:3 (2012) (“Police officers do not apply the concept of reasonable doubt; they generally don’t get 
the entire story. . . . [T]he concept of probable cause to arrest somebody is clearly different and has a 
different role in our country than proof beyond and to the exclusion of ev ”). ery reasonable doubt.
 Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1343 
997)
 25 DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 37. 
 26 See DiFilippo, supra note 1 (“No one tracks how often erroneous arrests occur . . . . But 
they happen frequently enough that the National Institute of Justice has funded a major study . . . in 
which researchers will create a database of wrongful arrests and convictions and recommend ways 
authorities can avoid them.”); see also Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 
1117, 1124 (2008) (“There is no longer any serious question that innocent people are charged with 
and convicted of crimes. These instances of wrongful conviction . . . likely affect thousands of 
people per year nationwide.” (footnote omitted) (citing Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, 
Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably Acquit the
(1 )). 
 27 DNA Exonerations Nationwide, INNOCENCE PROJECT, www.innocenceproject.org/ 
Content/Facts_on_PostConviction_DNA_Exonerations.php# (last visited May 17, 2013) (“Since 
1989, there have been tens of thousands of cases where prime suspects were identified and 
pursued—until DNA testing (prior to conviction) proved that they were wrongly accused.”); see also 
Leipold, supra note 13, at 1298 (“More troubling, there is increasing evidence that the number of 
innocent defendants who end up convicted is unacceptably large. The string of recent stories about 
people convicted of crimes they apparently did not commit, coupled with persistent questions about 
the validity of eyewitness identification and confessions, continue to raise questions about the 
judicial truth-seeking mission.” (footnotes omitted)). 
5
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in at least 1,480 wrongful detentions in Los Angeles County 
alone
 that false arrests and 
crim
 
and government misconduct.”28  A recent Los Angeles Times 
investigation revealed that, in the last five years, law enforcement errors 
resulted 
.29 
Although an erroneous arrest may be lawful, other arrests may be 
the result of unlawful police action.30  There is a dearth of reliable 
statistics indicating the frequency of police misconduct, primarily due to 
state laws protecting the confidentiality of such information.31  Yet, this 
shortage of data has not hindered public recognition
inal accusations occur with striking frequency. 
In 2009, David Packman, a private researcher, founded the National 
Police Misconduct Statistics and Reporting Project (NPMSRP) to fill this 
statistical void.32  With no access to law enforcement records on 
incidents of police misconduct, NPMSRP bases its statistical 
compilations and analyses on credible media reports of unlawful police 
action.33  In 2010, NPMSRP recorded “4,861 unique reports of police 
misconduct that involved 6,613 sworn law enforcement officers and 
 
 28 DiFilippo, supra note 1; see also DNA Exonerations Nationwide, supra note 27 (“While 
DNA testing was developed through extensive scientific research at top academic centers, many 
other forensic techniques — such as hair microscopy, bite mark comparisons, firearm tool mark 
analysis and shoe print comparisons—have never been subjected to rigorous scientific evaluation. 
Meanwhile, forensics techniques that have been properly validated—such as serology, commonly 
known as blood typing—are sometimes improperly conducted or inaccurately conveyed in trial 
testimony.”); Leipold, supra note 13, at 1298 n.5 (referencing a case study that found in a majority 
of cases where DNA evidence later established innocence, the defendant’s guilt was based on 
erroneous eyewitness identification); Bowers, supra note 26, at 1131 (noting that over three quarters 
f pos
oned-in-la-county/ (noting that 
o ke in the identity of the arrested person).  In some cases, it took 
s an
ent the examination of police misconduct 
orm
s ownership rights to the Cato Institute in 2012). 
o t-conviction DNA exonerations overturned convictions based, at least partly, on inaccurate 
eyewitness identification evidence). 
 29 Report: Hundreds Wrongly Imprisoned in LA County, CBS LOS ANGELES (Dec. 25, 2011), 
losangeles.cbslocal.com/2011/12/25/report-hundreds-wrongly-impris
the m st common error was a mista
day d even weeks to release the wrongfully detained person.  Id. 
 30 DiFilippo, supra note 1. 
 31 See David Packman, 2010 Q3 National Police Misconduct Statistical Report, CATO INST. 
(Nov. 7, 2010), www.policemisconduct.net/2010-q3-national-police-misconduct-statistical-report/ 
(“Despite becoming a more prominent issue in landscape of American public opinion, police 
misconduct is still a largely unstudied issue and no other sources of current statistical and trending 
data exist . . . to analyze the nature, persistence, and prominence of police misconduct in 
America. . . . [M]ost states currently have laws that prev
inf ation recorded by individual agencies themselves by the public and no other agency tracks 
police misconduct data in any publicly available way.”). 
 32 About, CATO INST., www.policemisconduct.net/about/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2013) (noting 
that Packman transferred hi
 33 Reporting Project—FAQs, CATO INST., www.policemisconduct.net/about/npmsrp-faq/ 
(last visited Apr. 8, 2013). 
6
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he jury.   In Los Angeles, 
appr
 shooting them, fabricated 
evide
“testilying” has developed to describe the practice of giving false 
testimony.40  Such police dishonesty recently prompted the Boston Police 
omm
 
6,826 alleged victims.”34  These numbers reflect an “indeterminate 
amount of under-reporting” by the news media of police misconduct, but 
NPMSRP remains the only compilation of credible, publicly available 
data on the issue.35 
Over the last two decades, criminal exonerations have resulted in 
the public exposure of incriminatory acts by police and prosecutors.  In 
New York, almost two thirds of the 175 DNA-exonerated defendants had 
been convicted in cases where police or prosecutorial misconduct 
“played an important role.”36  State misconduct included suppression of 
exculpatory evidence, knowing use of false testimony, witness coercion, 
evidence fabrication, and false statements to t 37
oximately 100 to 150 criminal defendants were exonerated between 
1999 and 2001 by the testimony of Officer Rafael Perez regarding the 
misconduct of police officers in the Community Resources Against 
Street Hoodlums (CRASH) unit of the Los Angeles Police Department’s 
Rampart division.38  According to Perez, the officers “routinely lied in 
arrest reports, shot and killed or wounded unarmed suspects and innocent 
bystanders, planted guns on suspects after
nce, and framed innocent defendants.”39 
Stories of police falsification are so pervasive that the moniker 
C issioner to issue a “bright line rule” that makes lying a “firing 
offense.”41  But acts of deceit by the police are not limited to oral 
 
  2010 Annual Report, CATO INST., www.policemisconduct.net/statistics/2010-annual-
port/  8, 2013)
34
. 
 certain precincts that it has spawned its own word: ‘testilying’”); Clifford 
rauss
re #_Summary (last visited Apr.
 35 Reporting Project—FAQs, supra note 33. 
 36 THE SENTENCING PROJECT, RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CRIMINAL COURT PROCESSING IN THE 
UNITED STATES 8 (Dec. 2007), available at www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/ 
CERD%20December%202007.pdf (quoting James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 2030 (2000)). 
 37 Id. 
 38 Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 533-34 (2005). 
 39 Id. at 534. 
 40 See I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, 83 IND. L.J. 835, 836 (2008) 
(noting that, in New York, a commission founded to investigate police corruption found that perjury 
was “so common in
K , Bratton Announces Plan To Train Officers To Testify, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1995, available 
at www.nytimes.com/1995/11/15/nyregion/bratton-announces-plan-to-train-officers-to-testify.html 
(“In some places the practice is so widespread that officers have a name for it: testilying.”). 
 41 Dick Lehr, Op-Ed., A New “Bright Line Rule” Against Lying, BOSTON GLOBE, July 31, 
2009, www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2009/07/31/a_new_bright_line_ 
rule_against_lying/. 
7
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measure of the 
drug
 
 
perjury.  Police officers have also falsified police reports, an act branded 
by the Boston police as “creative writing.”42 
Moreover, pervasive bias amongst law enforcement agencies results 
in the disproportionate policing of minority communities.43  Recent 
research reveals a disparity in policing practices regarding drug-related 
arrests.44  African-Americans make up 13% of the national population 
and 14% of monthly drug users, yet they represent 37% percent of the 
persons arrested for drug offenses and 56% of persons in prison on drug 
convictions.45  These higher arrest rates reflect law enforcement’s 
emphasis on inner-city areas, where drug use is more likely to occur in 
“open-air drug markets.”46  This reliance on visibility as a 
 sales in a neighborhood “greatly overestimates the degree to which 
African-Americans are involved in the drug trade and discounts the 
active drug selling economy in majority white communities that tends to 
take place behind closed doors and out of public view.”47 
Data from California mirrors that of the rest of the nation, with law 
enforcement agencies disproportionately targeting minority 
communities.48  A 2010 study found that California law enforcement 
agencies excessively target young African-Americans for marijuana 
  Id. (stating that an off-duty Boston police officer approached the author after a talk at a 
bookstore to discuss the practice of falsified police reports, a practice that police officers refer to as 
“creative writing”). 
 practices. Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road 
ork: R H. L. REV. 651, 656 (2002).  
ral reforms reflect the widespread recognition that racial profiling 
M
 e h
ever, the 
e lnerable [to] police enforcement . . . .”). 
IA (2010), available at 
rg/docUploads/ArrestingBlacks.pdf; CTR. ON JUVENILE & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 
AN 
42
 43 Until recently, law enforcement agencies have successfully resisted efforts to quantify the 
frequency and impact of racial profiling
W acial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the Highway, 101 MIC
However, significant state and fede
is a problematic practice of law enforcement. Id. at 656-57 (“[I]n the last few years . . . racial 
profiling has become an increasingly powerful political issue . . . .  As of this writing, at least twelve 
states and hundreds of cities have passed laws requiring racial record keeping, and several additional 
jurisdictions must keep such records under consent decrees entered into after being sued by the 
United States Department of Justice.”). 
 44 See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 36, at 19, 19 n.63. 
 45 Id. at 19. 
 46 Id. at 20; see also ALEX HAROCOPOS & MIKE HOUGH, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DRUG 
DEALING IN OPEN-AIR ARKETS 7 (June 2012), available at www.cops.usdoj.gov/Publications/ 
06127482.pdf (“Open-air drug markets operate in geographically well-defined areas at identifiable 
times so buyers and sellers can locate one another with ase . . . [w ere] there will be few barriers to 
access, and anyone who looks like a plausible buyer will be able to purchase drugs. . . . How
natur of open markets means that market participants are vu
 47 See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 36, at 20. 
 48 HARRY G. LEVINE, JON B. GETTMAN & LOREN SIEGEL, MARIJUANA ARREST RESEARCH 
PROJECT, ARRESTING BLACKS FOR MARIJUANA IN CALIFORN
www.drugpolicy.o
S FRANCISCO’S HIGH AFRICAN AMERICAN ARREST RATE (2006), available at 
www.cjcj.org/uploads/cjcj/documents/SF_High_African_American_Arrest_Rate.pdf. 
8
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 are in Sacramento.  They are arrested at twice the rate of 
black
s and 
hosp
 
offenses.49  The study covered twenty-five of California’s major cities 
and found that the police in those cities arrested blacks “at four, five, six, 
seven, and even twelve times the rate of whites.”50  With the data 
showing that black youth use marijuana at lower rates than white youth, 
these statistics paint a picture of injustice.51 
In 2006, the San Francisco Chronicle published an article that sent 
“shock waves” through the community;52 it reported that the city’s law 
enforcement agencies arrest African-Americans at much higher rates 
than in California’s other big cities.53  The numbers were alarming: 
“Black people in San Francisco are arrested for felonies at nearly twice 
the rate they
 people in Fresno, three times the rate in San Jose, Los Angeles, 
Long Beach and San Diego, and four times the rate in Oakland.”54  A 
subsequent study debunked any plausible denials of this discriminatory 
practice in citywide drug arrests,55 finding that African-Americans 
constitute about one fourth of the city’s drug abuse death
italizations, whereas 57% percent of drug arrests are African-
American.56 
Like the disproportionate rate of lawful arrests, the rate of false drug 
arrests in California is “substantially higher” for African-Americans and 
Hispanics than for white communities.57  Not surprisingly, the “great 
majority” of exonerated defendants in the CRASH scandal were young 
Hispanic men who had pled guilty to false gun or drug charges.58 
 
 49 LEVINE, GETTMAN & SIEGEL, supra note 48, at 4. 
 50 Id. at 3, 7 (citing, among others, the following statistics for marijuana possession arrests: 
Los Angeles arrests blacks at seven times the rate of whites; San Diego arrests blacks at six times the 
rate of whites; and Pasadena arrests blacks at 12.5 the rates of whites). 
ate Raises Call for Inquiry, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 17, 2006, 
www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2006/12/17/MNGF8N04MD1.DTL&ao=all 
The 
he numbers said they are 
isturb e an investigation.”) 
. 
 to Abuse, USA TODAY, Jan. 2, 2001, at 10A (“A study 
fo
ss et al., supra note 38, at 534. 
 51 Id. at 4. 
 52 Nanci Clarence, BASF Takes a Critical Look at San Francisco’s African American Arrest 
Rates, S.F. ATT’Y, Fall 2007, at 6, available at www.sfbar.org/forms/sfam/q32007/pres_column 
_q3_2007.pdf. 
 53 Susan Sward, High Black Arrest R
available at 
(“ disparity between San Francisco’s black felony arrest rates and the seven other largest 
cities’ . . . is so large that many experts and civic leaders who reviewed t
‘d ing’ and requir
 54 Id. 
 55 LEVINE, GETTMAN & SIEGEL, supra note 48, at 5 (“African Americans’ arrest levels for 
drugs far exceed their contribution to the city’s drug abuse problem.”). 
 56 Id. at 7
 57 Barry Steinhardt, Law Opens Door
done r the California Assembly showed that there was a substantially higher rate of false arrests 
for drug crimes for blacks and Hispanics, than for whites. Racial profiling continues to be a factor in 
these arrests.”). 
 58 Gro
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r who goes by the nickname “El Toro.”   The 
mista
d.”   In April 2011, Mr. 
Delacruz was nearly deported to the Dominican Republic after federal 
ted 
the
This persistent police harassment caused Mr. Delacruz’s own 
daug
Every year, a significant number of Californians are arrested but 
ultimately not convicted of a crime.  In 2010, 31% of felony arrestees in 
alif —93,015 of 298,647 adult felony arrests—were ultimately not 
ty of the offense for which they were arrested.68  Although a 
 
The story of Jose Delacruz, a Bronx deli worker and father of two, 
exemplifies the injustice that can result from law enforcement error and 
bias.59  Mr. Delacruz possesses the same birth name and birthday as a 
deported drug deale 60
ken identification of Mr. Delacruz as “El Toro” has led to four 
wrongful arrests, an FBI interrogation, and near-deportation.  His 
physical appearance and fingerprints do not match El Toro, and he 
carries a court-certified document on his person that attests to his correct 
identity.61  Nonetheless, he continues “getting arrested after routine 
traffic stops and background checks, roughed up by disbelieving cops 
and accused of crimes he never committe 62
agents detained him for four days before determining they had arres
 wrong person.63 
hters to believe that he was “guilty of something.”64  Moreover, the 
erroneous arrests are a significant barrier to his attempts to find better 
employment.65  The New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission 
denied his application for a taxi license based on their belief that he is a 
“wanted criminal.”66  Meanwhile, Mr. Delacruz awaits an ever-elusive 
resolution: “I just want to clear my name.”67 
B.  AN ARREST RECORD BURDENS THE ARRESTEE WITH CONTINUED 
LAW ENFORCEMENT SCRUTINY AND EMPLOYMENT BARRIERS 
C ornia
found guil
 
 59 Kev 
a rted 
in Deutsch, Deli Worker Wrongly Arrested Four Times Because He Has Same Name 
s Dep D ug Dealer “El ” N.Y. DAILY o r Toro, NEWS, Aug. 15, 2011, available at 
articles.nydailynews.com/2011-08-15/news/29907484_1_drug-rap-drug-dealer-deli-worker. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
63  Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN CALIFORNIA 50 (2010) (showing that 9,980 felony 
arrestees were released by law enforcement, 46,054 felony complaints were denied, 36,378 felony 
cases were dismissed by the court, and 603 felony arrestees were acquitted of the charges). 
10
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d at the moment of their 
arrest.   Indeed, all arrests of any individual will be reported on that 
alifornians arrested for 
but not convicted of a felony in 2010, two tangible injustices exist: the 
arres
ection 13100 further mandates that criminal justice agencies 
and 
 
number of those arrestees may have had previous contact with the 
criminal justice system,69 many arrested persons have never been 
convicted of a crime.70  Every year, an unacceptable number of 
Californians are burdened with a criminal recor
71
person’s criminal record.72  For those 93,015 C
t record may be used by law enforcement to justify future arrests 
and by certain employers to deny employment. 
1.  Law Enforcement’s Use of the Arrest Record 
Despite the tenuousness of an arrest record’s relevance to a person’s 
criminal culpability, California’s legislative provisions permit the 
retention and use of arrest records in future law enforcement actions 
against the arrestee.  In section 13100 of the Penal Code, the California 
Legislature declared that state criminal justice agencies require 
“complete criminal record information,”73 which includes a summary of 
arrests.74  S
courts have “speedy access” to all felony and select misdemeanor 
arrests, including their final dispositions.75  For felony arrests followed 
by the filing of a complaint, the Legislature authorizes criminal justice 
agencies to receive regular access to the detailed criminal history of the 
arrestee.76 
 
 69 Bowers, supra note 26, at 1125 (noting that, in 2002, seventy-six percent of state-court 
felony defendants from the nation’s seventy-five largest counties had a criminal history). 
t 50 (showing that, from 2005 to 2009, 
ousan
nd therefore technically have a criminal 
d ime. This is true not 
nly for viduals arrested for serious offenses.”). 
 70 Solomon, supra note 10, at 1. 
 71 See CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 68, a
th ds of felony arrestees were not found guilty of the offense for which they were arrested: 
87,755 of 319,587 adult felony arrests in 2005; 93,095 of 319,818 adult felony arrests in 2006; 
96,797 of 332,647 adult felony arrests in 2007; 90,776 of 325,241 adult felony arrests in 2008; and 
92,258 of 306,170 adult felony arrests in 2009); Solomon, supra note 10, at 1 (“[W]hat is often 
forgotten is that many people who have been arrested—a
recor that shows up on a background check—have never been convicted of a cr
o  those charged with minor crimes, but also for indi
 72 See infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text. 
 73 CAL. PENAL CODE § 13100(a) (Westlaw 2013). 
 74 CAL. PENAL CODE § 13102 (Westlaw 2013).  Local law enforcement agencies are required 
to report arrests to the Department of Justice (DOJ). CAL. PENAL CODE § 13150 (Westlaw 2013).  
Section 13125 provides the information that state and local agencies must record, including personal 
identification information, arrest data, police disposition information, and information about further 
roceep dings. CAL. PENAL CODE § 13125 (Westlaw 2013). 
 75 CAL. PENAL CODE § 13100(c) (Westlaw 2013). 
 76 CAL. PENAL CODE § 13100(d) (Westlaw 2013). 
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y the police when 
inves
ning of a criminal investigation or when seen by 
polic
 
In Loder v. Municipal Court, the California Supreme Court 
sanctioned several law enforcement uses of information obtained from 
arrest records.77  Law enforcement agencies may lawfully obtain and 
retain the arrestee’s fingerprints, photograph, and “vital statistics.”78  
Information obtained at the arrest may be used b
tigating subsequent criminal activity.79  The arrest record may 
lawfully be used as a justification to suspect an arrested person of future 
offenses,80 and to support a finding of probable cause to re-arrest a 
person on different charges.81  Courts have upheld arrests based on no 
more than the person’s arrest history and one additional—and arguably 
innocuous—observation about the arrestee’s activities such as the 
“comings and goings” from the individual’s home.82 
The use of arrest records to justify subsequent arrests contributes to 
the reality that persons with a criminal record constitute the great 
majority of criminal defendants generally.83  They are “common first 
targets” at the begin
e on the public sidewalk or in the building lobbies of high-crime 
 
  Loder v. Mun. Court, 553 P.2d 624, 628-30 (Cal. 1976). 
 78 Id. at 628.  Loder and the current statutory definition of “book” fail to provide further 
detail regarding the statistical information taken from an arrestee other than the person’s fingerprints 
nd ph
erpetrator of a subsequent 
rime. 
rtainly not suffice to constitute probable cause for search or arrest, . . . still a 
. 1985) (“Under 
alifor
magistrate’s determination of 
robab
5 Cal. Rptr. at 317; see also People v. Mikesell, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 708, 712 (Ct. 
pp. 1 inding the existence of probable cause based on the “functional equivalent” of a drug 
rrest r
77
a otograph. Id.; CAL. PENAL CODE § 7(21) (Westlaw 2013) (“To ‘book’ signifies the recordation 
of an arrest in official police records, and the taking by the police of fingerprints and photographs of 
the person arrested, or any of these acts following an arrest.”). 
 79 Loder, 553 P.2d at 628 (“[A] photograph taken pursuant to even an illegal arrest may be 
included among those shown to a witness who is asked to identify the p
c . . . [A]nd the same identification function is served, of course, by the arrestee’s fingerprints 
and other recorded physical description.”). 
 80 Id. at 628-29 (“Often the prior arrest is not an isolated event but one of a series of arrests 
of the same individual on the same or related charges. This is especially true when the crime in 
question is typically subject to recidivism, such as the use of addictive drugs, child molesting, 
indecent exposure, gambling, bookmaking, passing bad checks, confidence frauds, petty theft, 
receiving stolen goods, and even some forms of burglary and robbery.”). 
 81 Id. at 629 (“Although previous arrests of a suspect in connection with illicit drug 
transactions will ce
suspect’s reputation as being involved in illicit drug traffic based on prior arrests may be 
considered.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting People v. Buchanan 103 Cal. Rptr. 66, 79 
(Ct. App. 1972)); see, e.g., People v. Aho, 212 Cal. Rptr. 686, 691 (Ct. App
C nia law, a suspect’s narcotic arrest record always has been considered relevant to the 
magistrate’s determination of probable cause.”); People v. Kershaw, 195 Cal. Rptr. 311, 317 (Ct. 
App. 1983) (“A suspect’s narcotics arrest record is relevant to the 
p le cause.”). 
 82 Kershaw, 19
A 996) (f
a ecord and observations of heavy traffic to and from the defendant’s home). 
 83 See Bowers, supra note 26, at 1125-26 (“[P]olice are prone to arrest recidivists on less 
concrete evidence, because police often start with the recidivists—for instance, by directing crime 
victims to mug-shot books composed exclusively of prior arrestees”). 
12
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minal record is likely 
to be based on less reliable evidence.   When police need to take swift 
actio
) resulted in a proliferation of 
crim
checks be conducted on all employees.   Over 80% of private companies 
use criminal background checks in their hiring processes.91  Upon 
 
areas.84  Moreover, an arrest of a person with a cri
85
n on a committed crime, or when they simply need higher arrest 
numbers, they “round up the usual suspects.”86  Consequently, these 
“usual suspects” constitute the majority of persons wrongfully accused of 
a criminal offense.87 
Compounding the lawful uses of the arrest record by police, 
employers may gain access to the arrest record and use it to bar the 
arrestee from a job opportunity. 
2.  Employers’ Uses of the Arrest Record 
The September 11, 2001, attacks (9/11
inal background checks by employers.88  Following 9/11, Congress 
passed legislation requiring expanded background checks for myriad 
employees such as port workers, airline and airport employees, and truck 
drivers who transport hazardous materials.89  Federal agencies 
subsequently issued guidelines recommending that criminal background 
90
uncovering an applicant’s criminal history, an employer is not likely to 
 
 84 Id. at 1125. 
 85 Id. at 1126. 
ndants.”).  Even when the evidence against the arrestee is most weak, 
n a third said they grew more concerned about workplace security after 
e terr
, in part, that employers may face 
ability  checks of the persons they hire.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
ty 
 
 86 Id. 
 87 See id. at 1125 (“[T]his recidivist majority is overrepresented among the population of 
wrongfully accused, because institutional biases select for erroneous arrest, prosecution, and trial 
conviction of recidivist defe
prosecutors can “go forward with charges and anticipate pleas because they know that recidivists 
cannot easily fight charges at trial under existing evidence rules.” Id. at 1127. 
 88 SEARCH, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TASK FORCE ON THE COMMERCIAL SALE OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE RECORD INFORMATION 1 (2005), available at www.search.org/files/ 
pdf/RNTFCSCJRI.pdf; see also Jon Bonné, Most Firms Now Use Background Checks, MSNBC 
(Jan. 21, 2004), www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4018280/ (“Sept. 11 clearly triggered many new concerns 
among employers. More tha
th or attacks.”). 
 89 SEARCH, supra note 88 at 1. 
 90 Id. (“The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), for example, has issued nonbinding ‘good 
practice’ guidelines recommending that food establishment operators conduct criminal background 
checks on all employees.”). 
 91 Bonné, supra note 88.  This high percentage reflects
li  for not conducting background
supra note 9, at 38 (“Employers and organizations are, for example, subject to potential liabili
under negligent hiring doctrines if they fail to exercise due diligence in determining whether an 
applicant has a criminal history that is relevant to the responsibilities of a job and determining 
whether placement of the individual in the position would create an unreasonable risk to other 
employees or the public.”). 
13
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mber of employers to view the entire arrest history of an 
empl
 nursing home 
care,
Commonly, arrest records fail to report the final disposition of the 
 
 
hire that applicant over a person without a record.92  This is especially 
true for African-Americans and Latinos.93 
Most employers are not authorized to receive information collected 
from the California Department of Justice (DOJ) regarding arrests that 
did not lead to a conviction.94  However, statutory exceptions allow a 
significant nu
oyee or applicant.95  Additionally, California law explicitly 
authorizes the DOJ to provide licensing authorities the arrest history of 
applicants for several professional licenses.96  These provisions create 
barriers for arrested persons in numerous and varied professional fields, 
such as teaching,97 private security,98 child day-care,99
100 real-estate appraisal,101 nursing assistants,102and chiropractic 
medicine.103 
Despite being connected to the arrested person’s fingerprints, the 
criminal record information provided by the DOJ is not without error.104  
 92 See Harry J. Holzer, Steven Raphael & Michael A. Stoll, Perceived Criminality, Criminal 
Background Checks, and the Racial Hiring Practices of Employers, 49 J.L. & ECON. 451, 453 (2006) 
Over ring ex-offenders.”); see also R(“  60 percent of employers indicate an aversion to hi esearch on 
eentry and E  2013), nij.gov/topics/corrections/reentry/ 
mploy City finding that a criminal record 
duce
DE § 432.7 (Westlaw 2013). 
otections do not inhibit 
isclos er); CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.7(e) 
estl  to “persons seeking employment for 
ositio
 criminal history records through improving court disposition 
port
R mployment, NAT’L INST. JUST. (Apr. 3,
e ment.htm (referencing a study conducted in New York 
re e likelihood of a callback or job offer by nearly 50%). s th
 93 Solomon, supra note 10, at 2. 
 94 C . PEN C  § 11105 (Westlaw 2013); C . LAB. COAL  AL ODE AL  
 95 C . L . CO  § 432.7(b) (Westlaw 2013) (providAL  AB DE ing that the pr
d e of arrests to a government agency employing a peace officur
(W  2013) (providing that the protections do not applyaw
p ns in the Department of Justice or other criminal justice agencies”); CAL. LAB. CODE § 
432.7(f) (Westlaw 2013) (authorizing a health facility employer to receive information on arrests for 
certain criminal offenses); CAL. PENAL CODE § 11105(m) (Westlaw 2013) (providing for disclosure 
of the full criminal record and any subsequent arrest records to employers that are licensed as a 
community care facility, residential care facility for the elderly, or child care center). 
 96 See infra notes 97-103 and accompanying text. 
 97 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44346.5 (Westlaw 2013). 
 98 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7574.11 (Westlaw 2013). 
 99 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1596.871 (Westlaw 2013). 
 100 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1265.5 (Westlaw 2013). 
 101 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 11343 (Westlaw 2013). 
 102 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1338.5 (Westlaw 2013). 
 103 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 16, § 321.1 (Westlaw 2013). 
 104 See Justice Records Improvement Program, BUREAU JUST. STAT. (2008), 
bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/nchip2.cfm (“The California Department of Justice will . . . improve the 
accuracy and accessibility of the state’s
re ing and transmissions of disposition data to the FBI.”); Gresher v. Anderson, 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
408, 421 (Ct. App. 2005) (“The Department [of Social Services] also conceded that . . . there were 
errors in the criminal record information it received from the Department of Justice. The Department 
admitted it had developed a form letter for use in such cases of error.”). 
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porting arrest records and expunged convictions.   
Unli
 
 
arrest—a dire omission for applicants or employees who were never 
convicted of the offense for which they were arrested.105 
California law prohibits most private-sector employers from 
accessing the criminal history information compiled and maintained by 
the DOJ.106  However, those employers may conduct criminal 
background checks through the use of commercial reporting agencies 
(CRAs), which compile criminal history information from public 
sources.107  CRAs overwhelmingly misreport information on criminal 
background checks.108  These reports have been found to be “rife with 
error,” inaccurately re 109
ke the criminal history information retained by the DOJ, the 
information collected by a CRA is not connected to the applicant’s 
fingerprints.110  CRAs send “runners” to the courthouses and police 
departments of the counties wherein the applicant or employee 
previously lived; the runners then search the public records for the 
individual’s name.111 
 105 See CRAIG N. WINSTON, THE NATIONAL CRIME INFORMATION CENTER: A REVIEW AND 
EVALUATION 14 (2005), available at www.besthire.com/Forms/NcicReportJuly252005.pdf 
Seri
. Only 50 percent of arrest records in [its 
 individuals to 
m cord information).  Aside from private defense attorneys and 
man
 found dozens of lawsuits, on behalf of hundreds of 
eople
(“ ous problems remain in the process to link dispositional information to the proper case and 
charge.”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 3, 86 (“Although the FBI maintains criminal 
history records submitted by all states and territories with criminal records on more than 48 million 
individuals, FBI criminal history records are not complete
database] have final dispositions.”); SEARCH, supra note 88, at 34 (“It is the custom of courts and 
criminal justice agencies to simply provide the information they have on file at the time it is 
requested. That information, however, may in some cases be missing dispositions or other data that 
may not be apparent to an end-user.”). 
 106 CAL. PENAL CODE § 11105(b) (Westlaw 2013) (delineating the entities and
who  the DOJ must provide criminal re
hu e societies, the enumerated recipients are public agencies or officials.  Id.  When required by 
statute, the DOJ must provide criminal record information to persons or entities not specified in 
section 11105. Id. § 11105(b)(13); see supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text. 
 107 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 43 (stating that CRAs collect and report “criminal 
history information, such as arrest and conviction information. . . . by going to original public 
sources of the information, such as courts, or from databases that have aggregated the information 
obtained in bulk, for a fee, from public agency sources”). 
 108 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 54 (noting “problems with the accuracy and 
completeness of the records being disseminated from commercial databases”); Michels, supra note 9 
(“[A] review of court records by ABC News
p , filed in the last two years against the major criminal records database companies, alleging 
that background checks contain inaccurate information about criminal convictions.”). 
 109 Oyama, supra note 9, at 188. 
 110 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 53 (“[S]earches of commercially available 
databases are name-based and do not provide for positive identification through a fingerprint 
comparison.”). 
 111 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 39 (“[E]mployers, or credit reporting agencies 
acting on their behalf, will conduct name-based searches of courthouses at the county level in an 
applicant’s past places of residence.”); SEARCH, supra note 88, at 9; Ben Geiger, Comment, The 
15
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likely the “most accurate” service 
prov
irectly to the employer. 
In this context of lawful access to arrest information, and inaccurate 
dy provided by California 
Penal Code section 851.8 offers a complete solution: the sealing and 
 
This name-based search method is fraught with opportunities for 
inaccuracy.112  A principal concern for an arrested person is the 
possibility that the runners may retrieve information about arrests that 
did not lead to a conviction.113  California law prohibits disclosure of 
such information to private-sector employers,114 yet these arrests may 
appear on the criminal background report in such a fashion that makes 
them nearly indistinguishable from bona fide conviction entries.115  
Nevertheless, this method—involving vendor review and summarizing of 
the criminal history information—is 
ided by CRAs.116  An even more troublesome practice of some 
CRAs is to provide employers with the court’s raw data on a prospective 
employee.117  If the “most accurate” method of reporting such 
information is fraught with error, accuracy can hardly be expected from a 
service that provides undeciphered, comprehensive criminal record 
information d
or improper reporting of past arrests, the reme
 
Case for Treating Ex-Offenders as a Suspect Class, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1191, 1199 n.47 (2006) 
(noting that Choicepoint, one of the major commercial reporting agencies, sends “runners . . . to 
manually retrieve criminal history information and build its
records” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 own private database of criminal 
 112 SEARCH, supra note 88, at 2 (noting the accuracy implications of using name-based 
searches in lieu of fingerprint-based searches). 
 113 Geiger, supra note 111 at 1199 n.47. 
 114 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1786.18(a)(7) (Westlaw 2013) (barring consumer reporting agencies 
from reporting arrests that did not lead to convictions).  Arrests may be reported if the information is 
 by the prosecutor, because the 
me consuming and expensive.  The vendor’s review and handling of criminal record 
form .”). 
irect vendor access are usually provided raw 
to be used in the underwriting of life insurance involving an amount at or above $250,000.  Id. § 
1786.18(b)(1).  An arrest may also be reported by a CRA if it is to be used by an employer who is 
“explicitly required by a governmental regulatory agency to check for records that are prohibited by 
subdivision (a) when the employer is reviewing a consumer’s qualification for employment.” Id. § 
1786.18(b)(2). 
 115 Interview with Meredith Desautels, Attorney and Director of the Second Chance Legal 
Clinic at the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights of the San Francisco Bay Area (Apr. 29, 2013) 
(noting that it is “exceedingly common” for arrest records to appear on the commercial background 
check in cases where criminal charges were filed then dismissed
arrest information is accessible to CRAs through the public court files). 
 116 SEARCH, supra note 88, at 12 n.61 (“[T]he most accurate method of criminal record 
retrieval may be through an in-person review of actual court docket records, however this service is 
typically more ti
in ation before delivery to the client will also affect pricing
 117 Id. (“Clients who retrieve records through d
data or record information. This type of service results in a low acquisition cost for the client but 
requires additional effort by the client to validate the accuracy of the record and its connection with 
the subject.”). 
16
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51.8 
imposes a standard on arrestees that often presents a complete obstacle to 
this remedy. 
A remedial statute, California Penal Code section 851.8 provides a 
stand
agency or court that provides the basic identifying information of the 
person and arrest.124  Additional documents—such as declarations, 
 
eventual destruction of the arrest record.118  However, section 8
II.  CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE SECTION 851.8 
ard and procedure under which a person may petition to seal and 
destroy the record of an arrest that did not lead to a conviction.119  If a 
section 851.8 petition is granted, the petitioner’s arrest record is sealed 
for three years and then permanently obliterated by any court, agency, 
entity, or person with a record of the arrest.120 
A.  THE PROCEDURE FOR PETITIONING FOR RELIEF UNDER SECTION 
851.8 
1.  Any Arrested Person Who Was Not Convicted of the Criminal Offense 
May Petition to Seal and Destroy the Arrest Record 
The section 851.8 remedy is available to persons who were arrested 
and not formally charged of a crime,121 whose formal charges were 
dismissed,122 or who were acquitted of the charges after court 
proceedings.123  To seek the sealing and destruction of an arrest record 
under section 851.8, an arrestee must submit a petition to the appropriate 
 
 118 CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8(a), (b) (Westlaw 2013). 
 119 CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8 (Westlaw 2013). 
al agency, person or entity.” Id. § 851.8(a), (b). In addition to the arrest record, 
e de
851.8), CAL. DEP’T OF 
USTICE
) of arrest, the arresting agency, agency case number(s), charge(s), and 
ispos
 120 CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8(a), (b), (j) (Westlaw 2013).  Once a section 851.8 petition is 
granted, the arresting agency and DOJ must request the destruction of arrest records given to “any 
local, state, or feder
th struction request must be destroyed. Id. 
 121 CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8(a) (Westlaw 2013). 
 122 CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8(c) (Westlaw 2013). 
 123 CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8(e) (Westlaw 2013). 
 124 Petition to Seal and Destroy Adult Arrest Records (Penal Code 
J , (July 2006), available at ag.ca.gov/idtheft/forms/bcii_8270.pdf (requiring the petitioner to 
provide the date(s
d ition). 
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The procedure to petition for section 851.8 relief depends on 
off were arrested but not formally charged must 
first petition the arresting agency to seal and destroy the arrest record.127  
Petit
ion 851.8 Petition 
 to respond as late as 
 
affidavits, and police reports—may be submitted in support of the 
petition.125 
whether the prosecutor formally charged the arrestee with a criminal 
ense.126  Persons who 
ions denied or ignored128 by the arresting agency may thereafter be 
brought in the court that possesses territorial jurisdiction over the 
matter.129  Additionally, persons whose formal charges were dismissed or 
who were acquitted after criminal proceedings may directly petition the 
court for section 851.8 relief.130  When filing in court, the petitioner must 
serve both the arresting agency and prosecuting attorney with notice and 
a copy of the petition no later than ten days prior to the hearing.131 
2.  The Interface Between the Different Time Limitations That Apply to a 
Sect
If the petitioner was not formally charged, she must first petition the 
arresting agency, which may respond within sixty days “after the running 
of the relevant statute of limitations.”132  If the arresting agency fails to 
respond, the petition is deemed denied and the petitioner may resubmit 
the petition in court.133  This time limit has been subject to confusing 
applications.  Under one interpretation, the petition would be deemed 
denied if the agency failed to respond within sixty days of receiving it.134  
The other interpretation allows the arresting agency
 
 125 CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8(b) (Westlaw 2013); Brian Dinday, Petitioning for Factual 
Innocence, CAL. LAW., June 2009, available at www.callawyer.com/clstory.cfm?pubdt=NaN&eid 
=9018 evid=1. 53&
 126 CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8(a), (c), (d) (Westlaw 2013) (providing for different procedures 
depending on whether an “accusatory pleading” had been filed). 
 127 CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8(a) (Westlaw 2013); Dinday, supra note 125.  The petitioner 
must also serve a copy of the petition upon the prosecuting attorney of the county or city with 
jurisdiction over the offense. CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8(a) (Westlaw 2013). 
 128 Dinday, supra note 125 (stating that it is “typical” for law enforcement agencies to ignore 
 851.§ 8 petitions). 
 129 CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8(b) (Westlaw 2013). 
 130 CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8(c), (e) (Westlaw 2013). 
 131 CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8(b) (Westlaw 2013). 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. 
 134 EDWARD A. RUCKER & MARK E. OVERLAND, 5 CAL. CRIMINAL PRACTICE: MOTIONS, 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND SENTENCING § 60:1 (2012). 
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sixty
al charges are issued, the 
arres
 to file after this time period has passed, an arrestee must 
show
 
 days after the statute of limitations on the criminal offense has 
run.135 
The following example illustrates how the latter interpretation of the 
arresting agency’s time frame would play out.  A person arrested for 
petty theft may be formally charged by the district attorney no later than 
one year after the arrest.136  As long as no form
tee may petition the arresting agency to seal and destroy the 
record,137 and the agency may wait to respond until one year and sixty 
additional days after the date of arrest.138  If the time limitation for 
prosecuting the offense has passed, the arresting agency must respond no 
later than sixty days after receiving the petition.139 
A separate statute of limitations applies to the section 851.8 petition 
itself.  Arrestees may petition for section 851.8 relief up to two years 
after the date of the arrest or the filing of criminal charges, whichever is 
later.140  In order
 good cause for the delay and that the delayed petition will not 
prejudice law enforcement or the prosecutor.141 
 
 135 CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8(b) (Westlaw 2013) (providing that an arresting agency may 
spon  statute of limitations” or within sixty days 
after 
CODE § 851.8(b) (Westlaw 2013); see id. §§ 487, 488, 490, 802. 
139
, 653 
, supra note 125.  Subsection (l) of the statute 
petitions. CAL. PENAL CODE § 
51.8( itation applies to “petitions for relief under 
 attempted to resolve this discrepancy. People v. Bermudez, 91 
 R
re d within sixty days of “the running of the relevant
“ receipt of the petition in cases where the statute of limitations has previously lapsed”); Dinday, 
supra note 125 (“If no charges were filed following an arrest, the petitioner must first submit a 
[petition] to the arresting police agency . . . . If the police ignore the [petition] (which is typical), the 
arrestee must wait until 60 days after the statute of limitations for the offense expires, and then file 
the [petition] in court.”). 
 136 See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 487, 488, 490 (Westlaw 2013) (providing that petty theft is 
punishable by fine or six months in jail, or both); CAL. PENAL CODE § 802(a) (providing that the 
prosecution of any offense not punishable by “death or imprisonment in the state prison or pursuant 
to subdivision (h) of section 1170 shall be commenced within one year after [its] commission”). 
 137 CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8(a) (Westlaw 2013). 
 138 See CAL. PENAL 
  CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8(b) (Westlaw 2013) (stating that if the law enforcement agency 
fails to respond “within 60 days after receipt of the petition in cases where the statute of limitations 
has previously lapsed, then the petition shall be deemed to be denied”). 
 140 CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8(l) (Westlaw 2013). 
 141 Id.  Although the accepted construction of section 851.8 applies this time limit to all 
section 851.8 petitions, the statutory language is internally inconsistent on this point. See People v. 
Bermudez, 264 Cal. Rptr. 60, 63 n.5 (Ct. App. 1989); People v. Gerold, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 649
(Ct. App. 2009) (citing Bermudez for the notion that the two-year time limitation applies to all 
section 851.8 petitions). See generally Dinday
indicates that the two-year limitation applies to all section 851.8 
8 l) (Westlaw 2013) (stating that the two-year lim
this section”).  Conversely, subsection (c) seems to indicate that no time limitation applies to 
defendants who were acquitted of the charges or whose formal charges were dismissed. CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 851.8(c) (Westlaw 2013) (stating that such persons may petition for relief “at any time after 
dismissal of the action”). 
  Prior to 2009, no courts had
Cal. ptr. 3d 510, 512-13 (Ct. App. 2009).  In Bermudez, the First District Court of Appeal 
19
Lyons: Presumed Guilty Until Proven Innocent
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2013
504 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43 
ting many offenses is three years or more.   A person 
arres
ution.   Should the prosecution mount a convincing argument, 
the c
 
The two-year limitation on filing a section 851.8 petition interfaces 
with the prosecution’s statute of limitations to create legal and practical 
consequences for the section 851.8 petitioner.  The statute of limitations 
for prosecu 142
ted for but not convicted of robbery,143 for example, must either 
petition for section 851.8 relief before the prosecutor is time-barred from 
filing formal charges, or wait until the three-year time limitation on the 
offense has run and hope that the court will find that good cause existed 
for the delay.144 
Although it is likely a court would find that the underlying time 
limitation provides good cause to delay the section 851.8 petition,145 this 
finding is not guaranteed.146  Moreover, the statute authorizes delayed 
petitions supported by good cause and in the absence of prejudice to the 
prosec 147
ourt may find that prejudice overrides good cause and deny the 
petition.148 
Additionally, the arresting agency’s timeframe for responding to a 
petition may prevent the arrestee from filing with the court before the 
termination of the two-year time limitation on the petition.  For example, 
a person arrested for but not charged with first-degree burglary must first 
petition the arresting agency for section 851.8 relief.149  Pursuant to 
 
addressed whether the two-year time limitation from subsection (l) would appl  to persons who were y
formally charged but not convicted of the crime. Id. at 513.  Based on the statute’s legislative 
history—which indicated the intent that the two-year time limit apply to all section 851.8 petitions—
nder section 851.8.  Id. at 513-14. 
felonies the applicable statute of limitations is 
 the statutory deadline arises when the accusatory pleading is filed more than two years 
efore Gerold, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 654 (“[T]he 
line for which relief from 
ing no good cause 
etition sixteen years after the dismissal of 
and the lack of statutory language limiting the scope of the two-year limitation, the Bermudez court 
concluded that it applies to anyone who petitions for relief u
 142 Dinday, supra note 125 (“For most common 
three years.” (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 801)). 
 143 See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 211, 213, 801 (Westlaw 2013). 
 144 See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
 145 See Bermudez, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 514 n.6 (“One obvious example of good cause for 
exceeding
b  the case is resolved in favor of the accused.”); 
section 851.8, subdivision (l), time frame is more akin to a filing dead
default may regularly be granted.”). 
 146 See People v. Bermudez, 264 Cal. Rptr. 60, 62-63 (Ct. App. 1989) (find
for the delay when the defendant filed his section 851.8 p
the rape charges against him and four years after he had obtained a letter from his former trial 
counsel in support of his petition to seal the arrest record). 
 147 See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
 148 See People v. Collins, No. A132034, 2012 WL 5378649, *3-4 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 2, 
2012) (upholding the trial court’s determination that the prosecution was prejudiced by the 
defendant’s eleven-year delay in filing the section 851.8 petition, because the court, police, and 
prosecutorial records had been destroyed within the statutory timeframe for destroying those 
records). 
 149 CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8(a) (Westlaw 2013). 
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ive 
it.
es before the 
statute of limitations on the offense has run.   Prosecutors generally 
t an 
arr   For the section 851.8 petitioner, the possibility of 
being re-charged for the offense is particularly challenging if the statute 
of li
barriers for 
secti
 
 
section 851.8 and the time limitation for prosecuting first-degree 
burglary, the arresting agency could wait three years and sixty days to 
grant or deny the petition.150  By that time, the two-year limitation on the 
section 851.8 petition would have run, necessitating that the court wa
151 
Unlike a person who was never formally charged, a person whose 
charges were dismissed may directly petition the court upon the 
dismissal of the charges.152  However, the petitioner faces the 
troublesome reality that the prosecutor can re-file charg
153
resist curtailing the statute of limitations to file charges agains
ested person.154
mitations for the offense is greater than two years.155  Accordingly, 
the petitioner must either file within section 851.8’s two-year time 
limitation and face the possibility of being thwarted by new charges or 
wait to file after the statute of limitations on the offense has run and face 
the possibility that the court will not waive the two-year limitation.156 
These conflicting time limitations create very real 
on 851.8 petitioners and may entirely prevent them from the 
opportunity to seek relief.  Even more burdensome, however, is the 
requirement that a petitioner prove her factual innocence before the court 
or arresting agency will grant the section 851.8 petition.157 
 150 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 459, 461, 801, 851.8(b) (Westlaw 2013). 
See Dinday, supra note 125 (“For most common felonies the applicable 
CODE § 801)); CAL. PENAL CODE § 17(a) 
est
 151 CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8(l) (Westlaw 2013). 
 152 CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8(c) (Westlaw 2013); Dinday, supra note 125. 
 153 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1387 (Westlaw 2013). 
 154 Dinday, supra note 125 (stating that a prosecutor may respond to a section 851.8 petition 
by asserting the “right to file criminal charges up until the expiration of the statute of limitations” 
and that prosecutors often “express reluctance at the surrender of that right”). 
 155 The statute of limitations for many criminal offenses exceeds the two-year filing limitation 
on section 851.8 petitions. 
statute of limitations is three years” (citing CAL. PENAL 
(W law 2013) (noting that felonies are punishable by state prison or “imprisonment in a county jail 
under the provisions of subdivision (h) of Section 1170”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 801 (Westlaw 2013) 
(prosecution for such offenses “shall be commenced within three years after commission of the 
offense”). 
 156 See supra notes 140-148 and accompanying text. 
 157 CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8(a), (b) (Westlaw 2013). 
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ordinary care 
and 
 exist to 
belie
ction 851.8 petitioner cannot establish factual 
innocence by presenting a viable defense to the crime charged.166  Nor is 
 
 
B.  THE SECTION 851.8 PETITIONER’S ONEROUS BURDEN: FACTUAL 
INNOCENCE 
A section 851.8 petitioner must make a showing of factual 
innocence by adducing evidence that proves “no reasonable cause exists 
to believe that [he or she] committed the offense for which the arrest was 
made.”158  “Reasonable cause” exists when a person of “
prudence” would “believe and conscientiously entertain an honest 
and strong suspicion that the person is guilty of a crime.”159 
The section 851.8 petitioner bears the initial burden of proving that 
no reasonable cause existed to believe that she committed the offense.160  
To do so, the petitioner may put forth any evidence that is “material, 
relevant, and reliable.”161  Even evidence, such as hearsay testimony, that 
would be inadmissible in a court proceeding on the petitioner’s guilt is 
allowed.162  If the court finds that the petitioner has met this burden, it 
then shifts to the prosecutor to show that reasonable cause does
ve that the petitioner committed the offense.163 
In 2003, the California Supreme Court decided People v. Adair, 
validating several narrow appellate interpretations of the section 851.8 
factual innocence standard.164  The Adair court found that the standard 
precludes a trial court from granting a petition if the court finds that any 
reasonable cause warrants belief in the petitioner’s guilt.165 
Accordingly, a se
 158 CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8(b) (Westlaw 2013). 
 159 People v. Adair, 62 P.3d 45, 51 (Cal. 2003); accord People v. Matthews, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
48, 3 ople v. Scott M., 213 Cal. Rptr. 456, 462-63 (Ct. App. 1985). 
al. Rptr. 
d 81  2003) 
[T]h
ceeding); Medlin, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 817 (“Even suppressed 
se of hearsay evidence”). 
ews, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348, 350 (Ct. App. 1992)). 
3 50-51 (Ct. App. 1992); Pe
 160 CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8(b) (Westlaw 2013); see also People v. Medlin, 100 C
3 0, 817 (Ct. App. 2009); People v. Chagoyan, 107 Cal. App. 4th 810, 816 (Ct. App.
(“ e arrestee bears the preliminary burden of establishing that no reasonable cause exists to 
believe that [he or she] committed the offense.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 851.8(b))). 
 161 CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8(b) (Westlaw 2013). 
 162 Adair, 62 P.3d at 51 (referring to the statutory language that permits the admission of 
“otherwise inadmissible evidence—such as police reports and evidence suppressed pursuant to 
section 1538.5” in a section 851.8 pro
evidence is considered.”); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8(b) (Westlaw 2013); Dinday, supra 
note 125 (noting that section 851.8 specifically allows petitioners to submit police reports as 
supporting evidence and that because police reports “frequently contain significant hearsay, the 
statute appears to authorize the u
 163 CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8(b) (Westlaw 2013). 
 164 See generally Adair, 62 P.3d 45; Leipold, supra note 13, at 1325 (noting that the section 
851.8 factual innocence standard has been “applied rigorously” by the courts). 
 165 Adair, 62 P.3d at 50. 
 166 Id. at 51 (quoting People v. Matth
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factu
arrest record.   
The section 851.8 petitioner must adduce evidence that proves her actual 
exo l question as to guilt.”170 
The courts have based this narrow interpretation on a determination 
that 
 
al innocence established by the prosecution’s failure to prove guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt, or even to some less burdensome standard.167  
Indeed, a jury verdict in favor of the petitioner, without more, fails to 
meet the evidentiary threshold to seal and destroy the 168
innocence of the charged offense169—“[i]n sum, the record must 
nerate, not merely raise a substantia
the Legislature intended to limit section 851.8 relief to only those 
individuals who have not committed a crime.171  In People v. Glimps, the 
state appellate court found that the factual innocence requirement reflects 
legislative recognition that a prosecutor may fail to meet the burden of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, resulting in the acquittal of a defendant 
who is not innocent.172 
Notwithstanding the Legislature’s intent that section 851.8 relief be 
granted only to those arrestees who are innocent of the charges, the 
“nearly-prohibitive” burden placed on petitioners likely prevents even 
the innocent from receiving the section 851.8 remedy.173 
C.  DOES SECTION 851.8 PROVIDE RELIEF SOLELY TO INDIVIDUALS WHO 
WERE WRONGFULLY ARRESTED? 
In Adair, the California Supreme Court sanctioned a series of 
appellate court statements that required a section 851.8 petitioner to 
 
 167 Id. at 54 (quoting People v. Glimps, 155 Cal. Rptr. 230, 235 (Ct. App. 1979)). 
 168 People v. Scott M., 213 Cal. Rptr. 456, 462 (Ct. App. 1985)) (“The jury’s verdict, which 
simply indicates that the prosecution did not prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, 
does not directly address whether he committed the charged offense . . . . The trial court does not 
‘disagree’ with the jury’s verdict when it denies a section 851.8 petition.  It refines that verdict by 
disting
as used in the section does not mean a lack of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt or even by a 
‘preponderance of evidence.’”). 
 170 Adair, 62 P.3d at 54. 
 171 Id. at 51; see also Legis. Counsel’s Digest, Assemb. B. 2861 (1979–1980 Reg. Sess.) 4 
le v. Bermudez, 
1 Ca pp. 2009). 
f proof required by the California vindication scheme is sufficiently daunting that it 
uishing between those cases where acquittal is based upon actual innocence and those where 
acquittal is based upon the prosecution’s failure of proof.” (citations omitted)), disapproved on other 
grounds by Adair, 62 P.3d at 53 n.6. 
 169 Id. at 463; see Adair, 62 P.3d at 54; Glimps, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 235 (‘“[F]actually innocent’ 
Stats. 1980, Summary Digest 383 (“This bill would provide a procedure whereby a person who has 
been arrested or detained and is factually innocent may request a law enforcement agency or the 
court to provide for the sealing and destruction of the arrest record.”), quoted in Peop
9 l. Rptr. 3d 510, 513 (Ct. A
 172 Glimps, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 234-35. 
 173 See Leipold, supra note 13, at 1324-25, 1325 & n.97 (noting that “the extremely high 
burden o
precludes most acquitted defendants from even considering an innocence petition”). 
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use no objective factors justified official action.’”   
Addi
 cause to 
arres
 crime.”   By this language, a showing that 
no reasonable cause existed to arrest the petitioner equates to a showing 
t qualified this unequivocal language in 
a footnote stating that “[i]n the context of a defendant who seeks a 
findi
statement directly conflicts with the mandate that a petitioner show 
“there was no reasonable cause to arrest [the petitioner] in the first 
180
llate decisions following Adair have resolved this conflict 
y e
at no “reasonable cause exists to believe” 
 
prove no reasonable cause existed at the time of the arrest.174  For 
example, the Adair court adopted the position that section 851.8 permits 
sealing the arrest record when petitioners can show “‘that the state 
should never have subjected them to the compulsion of the criminal 
law—beca 175
tionally, the court ratified the notion that proving factual innocence 
“entails establishing as a prima facie matter not necessarily just that the 
[defendant] had a viable substantive defense to the crime charged, but 
more fundamentally that there was no reasonable cause to arrest [the 
petitioner] in the first place.”176  These statements, in effect, direct that 
factual innocence may only be found in those cases where the police had 
no lawful basis to arrest the section 851.8 petitioner. 
Indeed, the defining language for the section 851.8 factual 
innocence standard parallels the language that defines probable
t.177  Probable cause to arrest a suspect exists when “the facts known 
to the arresting officer would lead a man of ordinary care and prudence 
to believe and conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion 
that the person is guilty of a 178
that the petitioner was arrested without probable cause. 
Nevertheless, the Adair cour
ng of factual innocence notwithstanding probable cause to arrest, 
facts subsequently disclosed may establish the defendant’s innocence.”179  
Rather than clarifying the court’s position, however, this qualifying 
place.”  
State appe
b mphasizing the statute’s use of the present tense form of “exist” 
when requiring a showing th
that the petitioner is guilty.181  In People v. Laiwala, the court found that 
 
 174 Adai , 62 P.3d at 51. 
 175 Id. (quoting People v. Scott
r
 M., 213 Cal. Rptr. 456, 463 (Ct. App. 1985)). 
 176 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting People v. Matthews, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348, 350 (Ct. App. 
1992)). 
 177 Id.; accord Matthews, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 350; Scott M., 213 Cal. Rptr. at 462-63. 
 178 People v. Harris, 540 P.2d 632, 635 (Cal. 1975) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 179 Adair, 62 P.3d at 51 n.4 (emphasis added). 
 180 Id. at 51. 
 181 People v. Laiwala, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 639, 642 n.3 (Ct. App. 2006); People v. Gerold, 94 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 649, 656 (Ct. App. 2009). 
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 then, section 851.8 relief would be available to persons who 
were
cess protection under 
the California Constitution is not limited to situations involving the 
 
pro al 
action.”  
 
use of the word “exists” necessitates finding that the existence of 
reasonable cause depends on current evidence as well as the evidence 
that existed at the time the arrest occurred.182  Under the Laiwala 
framework,
 lawfully arrested but nevertheless innocent of the offense. 
Although this statutory interpretation resolves the otherwise 
conflicting statements in Adair, Adair remains the most recent 
comprehensive treatment of the section 851.8 factual innocence standard 
by the State’s high court.183 
III.  SECTION 851.8 VIOLATES PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS UNDER THE 
CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION 
The California Constitution guarantees that no person may be 
“deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”184  
Unlike its federal equivalent,185 procedural due pro
deprivation of a liberty or property interest.186  Rather, California’s due
cess protection focuses generally on “deprivatory government
187
 
 182 Laiwala, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 642 n.3. 
 183 Since Adair, four California Supreme Court cases have cited but not discussed section 
851.8. See People v. Cole, 95 P 3d. 811, 844 (Cal. 2004); People v. Sapp, 73 P.3d 433, 473 n.3 (Cal. 
2003); People v. Butler, 79 P.3d 1036, 1040 (Cal. 2003); People v. Stowell, 79 P.3d 1030, 1034 
(Cal. 2003). 
ntitlement” to the claimed interest. Id. at 576-77; see also Town of Castle Rock, Colo. 
. Gon
. 1003, 1011, 1020 (2011).  For this reason, the section 851.8 petitioner’s interest is not 
  protections. 
Jose, 245 Cal. Rptr. 728, 731-32 (Ct. 
pp. 1
9 P.2d at 627; Hernandez v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 30 Cal. 3d 70, 81 n.12 
al. 1
 184 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a). 
 185 Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972) (“The requirements of 
procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s protection of liberty and property. . . .  But the range of interests protected by 
procedural due process is not infinite.”).  The federal procedural due process protection “is a 
safeguard of the security of interests that a person has already acquired in specific benefits.” Id. at 
576 (emphasis added).  The person seeking federal due process rights in a property interest must 
possess an “e
v zales, 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005); Sara B. Tosdal, Note, Preserving Dignity in Due Process, 62 
HASTINGS L.J
likely to trigger federal due process
 186 People v. Ramirez, 599 P.2d 622, 624 (Cal. 1979) (stating that due process analysis is not 
concerned with a “judicial attempt to decide whether the statute has created an ‘entitlement’ that can 
be defined as ‘liberty’ or ‘property’”); Ryan v. Cal. Interscholastic Fed’n-San Diego Section, 94 Cal. 
App. 4th 1048, 1069 (Ct. App. 2001) (“Our state due process constitutional analysis differs from that 
conducted pursuant to the federal due process clause in that the claimant need not establish a 
property or liberty interest as a prerequisite to invoking due process protection.” (citing Ramirez, 599 
P.2d at 624)); San Jose Police Officers Ass’n v. City of San 
A 988). 
 187 Ramirez, 59
(C 981). 
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e process under the state 
constitution.   The Ramirez court explicitly rejected the federal 
anal om 
from e’s 
libe  to 
depr rty 
inte ing 
trea .   Instead of focusing on the nature of 
the i
e y entitlement to trigger due process 
protections, it provides little guidance for determining what deprivatory 
actions trigger due process safeguards:193 
mpt to decide 
ement” that can be defined as 
 
In People v. Ramirez, the California Supreme Court set out the 
expansive standard for procedural du
188
ysis189 and based its holding on the broader principle that freed
 arbitrary adjudicative procedures is a “substantive element of on
rty.”190  Under Ramirez, an individual who has been subjected
ivatory governmental action “always has a due process libe
rest both in fair and unprejudiced decision making and in be
ted with respect and dignity ”191
nterest, the state due process analysis looks at the administrative 
process itself, with the intent to promote “accuracy and reasonable 
predictability” in governmental decisionmaking.192 
A.  THE INTEREST CLAIMED BY A SECTION 851.8 PETITIONER TRIGGERS 
STATE DUE PROCESS PROTECTION UNDER THE RAMIREZ ANALYSIS 
Although Ramirez makes clear that a person need not show 
deprivation of a liberty or prop rt
[W]hen a person is deprived of a statutorily conferred benefit, due 
process a start not with a judicial attenalysis must 
whether the statute has created an “entitl
“liberty” or “property,” but with an assessment of what procedural 
protections are constitutionally required in light of the governmental 
and private interests at stake.194 
 
 188 Ramirez, 599 P.2d 622. 
 189 Id. at 625-27 (criticizing the federal due process analysis, which “fails to give sufficient 
weight to the important due process value of promoting accuracy and reasonable predictability in 
government decision making”); see also Ryan, 94 Cal. App. 4th at 1069 (“[P]rocedural due process 
under the California Constitution is ‘much more inclusive’ and protects a broader range of interests 
than under the federal Constitution.”); Tosdal, supra note 185, at 1014 (“[T]he California Supreme 
Court expressly critiqued the Supreme Court’s approach in Roth and set forth a new framework for 
procedural due process in California in People v. Ramirez.”). 
 190 Ramirez, 599 P.2d at 624, 627. 
 191 Id. at 627. 
 192 Id. (“The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action 
of government.”). 
 193 See Tosdal, supra note 185, at 1016 (“[T]he language of the opinion naturally leads to 
multiple interpretations of the appropriate due process trigger.”). 
 194 Ramirez, 599 P.2d at 624. 
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This language has been subject to confused and inconsistent 
applications by the lower courts.195  Some courts have interpreted it to 
mean that a person must be deprived of a statutorily conferred benefit in 
order to trigger state due process protections.196  Although the Ramirez 
analysis arose from a case involving governmental deprivation of the 
defendant’s statutory interest,197 the court did not mandate that a claimant 
allege the deprivation of a statutorily conferred interest to trigger 
procedural due process analysis.198 
Subsequent decisions by the State’s high court signal that due 
process review is triggered by any deprivatory governmental action upon 
a private individual.199  These decisions focus on “balancing private and 
governmental interests, and on considerations of arbitrariness in existing 
 
 195 See Tosdal, supra note 185, at 1005, 1016-18. 
 196 See Gresher v. Anderson, 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 408, 418-19 (Ct. App. 2005) (stating that the 
claimant must “identify a statutorily conferred benefit or interest of which he or she has been 
deprived to trigger procedural due process under the California Constitution and the Ramirez 
analysis of what procedure is due”); Schultz v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 206 Cal. Rptr. 910, 918 (Ct. 
App. 1984) (finding that Ramirez did not control because the plaintiff had not shown a “statutory 
interest subject to deprivation”); Ryan v. Cal. Interscholastic Fed’n-San Diego Section, 94 Cal. App. 
4th 1048, 1071 (Ct. App. 2001) (“[T]he claimant must nevertheless identify a statutorily conferred 
benefit or interest of which he or she has been deprived to trigger procedural due process under the 
California Constitution and the Ramirez analysis of what procedure is due.”); see also Tosdal, supra 
note 185, at 1018 (“Others have relied on the phrase ‘statutorily conferred benefit’ to limit the scope 
of the due process trigger.”). 
 197 Ramirez, 599 P.2d at 624, 624-25.  The statutory interest was the right to remain confined 
rests.  See id.; Ramirez, 599 P.2d at 627 (stating that due process looks 
quoting Ramirez and indicating that due 
roces ed by an assessment of the procedural protections required in light of the 
over ivate interests at stake); Saleeby v. State Bar, 702 P.2d 525, 534 (Cal. 1985) 
tatin
at the California Rehabilitation Center (CRC) pursuant to California Welfare & Institutions Code 
section 3051. Id.  The defendant had previously been committed to the CRC and was subsequently 
found unfit by the Director of Corrections for further confinement in the CRC.  Id. at 624.  In the 
appeal, he argued that the CRC procedures for excluding him constituted a denial of his 
constitutional right to procedural due process. Id. at 625.  The court agreed, finding that the due 
process clause entitles the “patient-inmate” an opportunity to respond to the grounds for exclusion 
prior to the final determination.  Id. at 631. 
 198 See Tosdal, supra note 185, at 1016-17 (noting that the Ramirez court discussed the 
statutory benefit at issue in that case without clearly stating that a statutorily conferred interest is 
necessary to trigger due process protections).  The case seemed to offer two alternative due process 
triggers: (1) the deprivation of a statutorily conferred interest, or (2) the balance between 
government and private inte
to “what procedural protections are warranted in light of governmental and private interests”). 
 199 See In re Jackson, 731 P.2d 36, 42 (Cal. 1987) (
p s analysis is trigger
g nmental and pr
(s g that the California due process analysis “focus[es] on the administrative process itself” and 
differentiating the state standard from its federal counterpart, which focuses on whether the claimant 
has a legitimate entitlement to a benefit); Van Atta v. Scott, 613 P.2d 210, 214 (Cal. 1980) (“In 
People v. Ramirez, this court held that the extent to which procedural due process relief is available 
under the California Constitution depends on a careful weighing of the private and governmental 
interests involved.” (citation omitted)). 
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due process 
prote
ociation v. City of San Jose, the court 
found that due process analysis was triggered by the claim of a retired 
, even 
tho tute 
gov ificates conferred a benefit on retired police officers, 
the court found that it “trigger[ed] procedural due process under the 
Calif
 
 
procedures.”200  In Saleeby v. State Bar, the petitioner had applied for 
reimbursement from the Client Security Fund (CSF), a fund established 
by the California State Bar to reimburse clients for pecuniary losses 
caused by the dishonest conduct of licensed attorneys.201  Although the 
Saleeby petitioner possessed no entitlement to reimbursement from the 
CSF, the lack of an entitlement was not dispositive of 
ctions.202  The State’s high court concluded that “the Bar’s exercise 
of discretion is reviewable to assure conformance to the purposes of the 
fund and to avoid the potential for arbitrary or discriminatory 
decisions.”203 
Some lower courts have applied Ramirez narrowly to require a 
statutorily conferred interest before due process analysis is triggered.204  
In San Jose Police Officers Ass
police officer who had been denied a concealed weapons certificate
ugh he possessed no right to the certificate.205  Because the sta
erning such cert
ornia Constitution and that Ramirez require[d] an analysis of what 
procedure is due.”206  By contrast, in Schultz v. Regents of the University 
of California, the court denied due process protection to a hospital 
employee who challenged the downward classification of his position.207  
The plaintiff’s interest was in no way attached to a statute, and under the 
court’s interpretation of Ramirez, the failure to claim a statutory interest 
resulted in the failure of the due process claim altogether.208 
Like the parties seeking relief in Saleeby and San Jose Police 
Officers, the section 851.8 petitioner seeks a statutory benefit for which 
 200 Tosdal, supra note 185, at 1020; Jackson, 731 P.2d at 42; Scott, 613 P.2d at 214; Gresher, 
ng that the state bar was statutorily authorized to exercise 
iscre
25 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 418-19. 
2 P.2d at 527-28 (noti 201 Saleeby, 70
d tion over the disbursement of monies from the CSF). 
 202 Id. at 534. 
 203 Id. at 533. 
 204 See Tosdal, supra note 185, at 1021; see also Schultz v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 206 Cal. 
Rptr. 910, 918, 922 (Ct. App. 1984); Ryan v. Cal. Interscholastic Fed’n-San Diego Section, 94 Cal. 
App. 4th 1048, 1071 (Ct. App. 2001).  However, these courts have not required that the statutory 
interest constitute an entitlement.  See Schultz, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 918; Ryan, 94 Cal. App. 4th at 1069. 
 205 San Jose Police Officers Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 245 Cal. Rptr. 729, 731 (Ct. App. 
1988) (finding that the Chief of Police of the City of San Jose had statutory authority to deny the 
certificate). 
 206 Id. at 732. 
 207 Schultz, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 912. 
 208 Id. at 918. 
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she p
enefit, it falls under even the narrower 
application of Ramirez that requires a denial of a statutory benefit.  
Acc ue 
proc
B.  A
V
C
res 
must be examined under the standard provi  and its 
prog
s used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
 
 
ossesses no presumptive entitlement.209  Because the section 851.8 
remedy is a statutorily conferred b
ordingly, a denial of the section 851.8 remedy would trigger d
ess analysis under Ramirez. 
NALYZED UNDER THE RAMIREZ FRAMEWORK, SECTION 851.8 
IOLATES PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS UNDER THE CALIFORNIA 
ONSTITUTION 
Having triggered due process analysis, the section 851.8 procedu
ded by Ramirez
eny.  To determine the sufficiency of a procedure under Ramirez, the 
arrested person’s interests must be balanced against those of the 
government.210  Ramirez requires that due process “maximize the 
accuracy of the resulting decision and respect the dignity of the 
individual subjected to the decisionmaking process.”211  Appropriate 
safeguards will vary with individual circumstances, but the primary 
purpose remains the same: to afford the impacted parties with a right to 
be heard at a “meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”212 
Ramirez provided four factors to assess the sufficiency of procedure 
under the California Constitution: 
(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action, (2) 
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the 
procedure
substitute procedural safeguards, (3) the dignitary interest in informing 
individuals of the nature, grounds and consequences of the action and 
 
 210 People v. Ramirez, 599 P.2d 622, 627 (Cal. 1979); Van Atta v. Scott, 613 P.2d 210, 214 
(Cal. 1980) (“In People v. Ramirez, this court held that the extent to which procedural due process 
feguards 
 any of procedural protection varies with the interests at stake, 
 also Mohilef v. Janovici, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 724 (Ct. App. 1996) (“We hold that 
at the defendant be 
rovid
209 Saleeby v. State Bar, 702 P.2d 525, 527, 534 (Cal. 1985); San Jose Police Officers Ass’n, 
245 Cal. Rptr. at 731-32. But cf. Tosdal, supra note 185 (discussing the federal due process 
requirement of an “entitlement” in the claimed interest). 
relief is available under the California Constitution depends on a careful weighing of the private and 
governmental interests involved.” (citation omitted)); see also San Jose Police Officers Ass’n, 245 
Cal. Rptr. at 732 (“Ramirez does not purport to require any particular level of procedural sa
in  particular case. . . . [T]he level 
considered according to the balancing formula set out in Ramirez.”). 
 211 Oberholzer v. Comm’n on Judicial Performance, 20 Cal. 4th 371, 390 (Cal. 1999). 
 212 Ryan v. Cal. Interscholastic Fed’n-San Diego Section, 94 Cal. App. 4th 1048, 1072 (Ct. 
App. 2001); see
due process is satisfied as long as the property owner receives adequate notice of the nature of the 
alleged nuisance and a meaningful opportunity to respond to the charges against him.”); People v. 
Arciga, 227 Cal. Rptr. 611, 619 (Ct. App. 1986) (stating that Ramirez required th
p ed a meaningful opportunity to respond to the grounds for exclusion from the CRC). 
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s in destroying 
 
in enabling them to present their side of the story before a responsible 
governmental official, and (4) the governmental interest, including the 
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.213 
These factors expand upon the federal test by including the private 
individual’s dignitary interest.214  Ramirez emphasized that the private 
individual’s participation in the process protects the dignitary values that 
underlie due process—only through such involvement can a person gain 
a meaningful understanding of what is happening and why.215  Moreover, 
by ensuring fairness in the “method of interaction” between the 
individual and government, due process affirmatively protects the 
individual’s inherent dignitary interest.216 
Using the four Ramirez factors, the balance between the arrested 
person’s interest in the section 851.8 remedy and the government’s 
interest in limiting section 851.8 relief weighs in favor of providing the 
arrested person with a more meaningful opportunity to achieve section 
851.8 relief. 
1.  The Arrested Person Has a Legitimate Interest in Protecting Against 
Governmental Retention and Dissemination of the Arrest Record 
An arrested person has discrete, significant interest
the arrest record—interests that have been recognized by both the 
California and United States Supreme Courts.  In Loder, the California 
Supreme Court acknowledged the arrested person’s legitimate interest in 
protecting against improper uses of her criminal record.217  The court 
found the principal concerns to be “inaccurate or incomplete arrest 
records, dissemination of arrest records outside the criminal justice 
system, and reliance on such records as a basis for denying the former 
 
 213 Ramirez, 599 P.2d at 627-28. 
 214 San Jose Police Officers Ass’n, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 735 (“The Ramirez court’s identification 
of a substantive ‘dignitary’ interest—‘an individual’s due process liberty interest in freedom from 
lifornia from federal law in the area of 
ue pr
arbitrary adjudicative procedures’—further differentiates Ca
d ocess.”). 
 215 Ramirez, 599 P.2d at 626-27, 632 (“[E]ven in cases in which [the individual’s] 
participation is unlikely to affect the outcome of the decision, it nevertheless promotes important 
dignitary values that underlie due process.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 216 Id. at 627 (“[F]reedom from arbitrary adjudicative procedures is a substantive element of 
one’s liberty.”). 
 217 Loder v. Mun. Court, 553 P.2d 624, 630 (Cal. 1976). 
30
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol43/iss3/6
2013] Presumed Guilty Until Proven Innocent 515 
 
main
arrest 
 
arrestee business or professional licensing, employment, or similar 
opportunities for personal advancement.”218 
Arrest records are subject to the inaccuracies and improper 
dissemination contemplated by Loder.219  The criminal records
tained and disseminated by the DOJ are far from infallible.220  
Commercial background reports often report arrest records to private 
employers despite the laws that prohibit such disclosure.221  Although 
many public entities are prohibited from considering arrest records in 
employment decisions, there are significant exceptions to this blanket 
prohibition.222  Several public employers and licensing boards are 
statutorily authorized to view the arrest record in conjunction with an 
arrested person’s application.223 
Although California law limits these uses, no law can preclude 
decisions made in the privacy of the decisionmaker’s mind.  Once the 
arrest record has been viewed, the “improper inference of guilt will be 
the one frequently drawn.”224  Logic and statistics dictate that an 
 
 218 Id.  Although Loder found that the arrestee’s legitimate interests were adequately protected 
by statute, this determination is inapposite to the present inquiry. Id. at 631.  Loder decided whether 
to issue a writ of mandate to seal an arrest record upon the arrestee’s claim that its retention violated 
his constitutional right to p vacy. Id. at 627-28.  The extraordinary nature of mandamus relief ri
counsels against applying Loder’s reasoning to a section 851.8 petition. See id. at 627 (noting that a 
grant of mandamus requires a clear and present duty on the part of the government and a “clear, 
present and beneficial right in the petitioner to the performance of that duty”).  Moreover, the Loder 
court’s finding that arrestees receive adequate statutory protection came at a time when the 
fere lative enactments). 
sions of disposition data to the FBI.”); 
resh
 § 11105(m) (Westlaw 2013) (providing for disclosure of the 
ll cri nd any subsequent arrest records to employers that are licensed as community 
or the elderly, or child care centers); CAL. BUS. & PROF. 
ODE
re nced statutes were untested. Id. at 631 (citing “recent” legis
 219 See discussion Part I, supra. 
 220 See Justice Records Improvement Program, supra note 104 (“The California Department 
of Justice will . . . improve the accuracy and accessibility of the state’s criminal history records 
through improving court disposition reporting and transmis
G er v. Anderson, 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 408, 421 (Ct. App. 2005) (“The Department [of Social 
Services] also conceded that ‘on rare occasions’ there were errors in the criminal record information 
it received from the Department of Justice. The Department admitted it had developed a form letter 
for use in such cases of error.”). 
 221 See supra notes 107-117 and accompanying text. 
 222 See supra notes 94-103 and accompanying text. 
 223 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE
fu minal record a
care facilities, residential care facilities f
C  § 7574.11 (Westlaw 2013) (security guard license); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 11343 
(Westlaw 2013) (real estate appraiser’s license); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44346.5 (Westlaw 2013) 
(teacher’s credentials); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1338.5 (Westlaw 2013) (nursing assistant 
license); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 16, § 321.1 (Westlaw 2013) (chiropractor’s license). 
 224 Utz v. Cullinane, 520 F.2d 467, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
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 applicants without an arrest record.  
an “unproved accusation” of criminality.  Accordingly, the 
state
individual as unfit.”   These decisions signal that state-sanctioned use 
of an arrest record to deny employment constitutes a governmental 
deprivation of individual liberty. 
 
record gives the employer an automatic basis to disqualify an applicant 
when there are ample employable 225
The State’s high court additionally recognizes the constitutional 
legitimacy of a person’s interest in the unimpeded pursuit of 
employment.226  Particularly relevant is the court’s decision in Endler v. 
Schutzbank, wherein the plaintiff was barred from obtaining employment 
in his chosen field because a government official labeled him a criminal 
“on the basis of unproved accusations” and threatened disciplinary action 
against anyone who might employ him.227  The court held that procedural 
due process requires that the government provide him “a full opportunity 
to present his defense.”228  Like the Endler allegations, an arrest record 
constitutes 
-authorized uses of a person’s arrest record229 require that the 
arrestee be given a meaningful opportunity to challenge the record. 
Likewise, in Doe v. Saenz, the state appellate court found that the 
potentially negative impact of an inaccurate criminal record upon 
employment triggers due process protection.230  The court stated that an 
employment denial based on the person’s criminal record “alters an 
individual’s preexisting status under state law by making a formal 
determination regarding his or her eligibility to work, drastically 
constrains future employment opportunities, and stigmatizes the 
231
 
 225 See id.; Holzer, Raphael & Stoll, supra note 92, at 453 (2006) (“Over 60 percent of 
employers indicate an aversion to hiring ex-offenders.”); NAT’L INST. JUST., supra note 92 
efere York City finding that a criminal record reduces the 
kelih
006) (“[T]he private 
inte
 
 
 
 al. Rptr. 3d at 148.  Saenz involved the plaintiffs’ request to receive a notice of 
non-exemptible offenses on which the community care provider based its decision to deny her 
ploym
ternal quotation marks omitted). 
148. 
(r ncing a study conducted in New 
li ood of a callback or job offer by nearly fifty percent). 
 226 Endler v. Schutzbank, 436 P.2d 297, 302 (Cal. 1968) (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment 
protects the pursuit of one’s profession from abridgement by arbitrary state action.”).  In Endler, the 
court stated that “[i]t has long been recognized that the right to follow any of the common 
occupations is a large ingredient in the civil liberty of the citizen.” Id. at 302 n.4 (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also Doe v. Saenz, 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 126, 148 (Ct. App. 2
rest at stake is the freedom to pursue a private occupation.”). 
227 Endler, 436 P.2d at 299. 
228 Id. at 304. 
229 See discussion Part I.B, supra. 
230 Saenz, 45 C
the 
em ent. Id. at 133-34.  The court required the Department of Social Services to provide the 
specific convictions upon which the employment decision was based, because “[e]rrors in conviction 
records could be addressed immediately.” Id. at 148 (in
 231 Saenz, 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 
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 United States 
Supreme Court has stated: “Where a person’s good name, reputation, 
him  In 
Wi , 
posted a notice in the town’s liquor stores that banned all sales or gifts of 
liquo
ours of the arrest, the “incriminating” evidence was revealed to 
be a
 
Freedom from stigmatization by the government is also an interest 
that has been recognized by courts.232  On this point, the
honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to 
, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential.”233 
sconsin v. Constantineau, a police chief, acting on statutory authority
r to the plaintiff for one year.234  The Court broadly found that such 
a label was “degrading” and could not be imposed without due 
process.235 
Kenny Woods’s story exemplifies governmental interference with 
these employment and reputational interests.  Publicly accused of the hit-
and-run death of Daniel Giletta, Mr. Woods was charged with murder on 
little more than the fact that his palm print was found on the vehicle.236  
Within h
 phone that did not belong to Woods and an officer’s eyewitness 
testimony claiming to have viewed Woods passing him on the highway 
at night travelling at 100 miles per hour.237  Nine months after his 
exoneration, Woods’ name was “all over the internet” linking him to the 
 
 232 Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971); San Jose Police Officers Ass’n v. 
City of San Jose, 245 Cal. Rptr. 728, 733 (Ct. App. 1988) (stating that, even though no stigma 
attached to the government’s decision to deny the petitioner a concealed weapons certificate, there 
would be a stigma if the statute “required the denial of a certificate to be based on the existence of a 
fact which impugned the retired officer’s good name, reputation, honor, or integrity”). 
 233 Constantineau, 400 U.S. at 437. 
 234 Id. at 434-35 (noting that the statute authorized “designated persons” to forbid the sale or 
gift of alcohol to a person who excessively drinks and thereafte
or exh
r causes certain unwanted conditions 
process. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976). Justice Rehnquist noted: 
[w]hile we have . . . pointed out the frequently drastic effect of the ‘stigma’ which may result 
from defamation by the government . . . this line of cases does not establish the proposition 
that reputation alone, apart from some more tangible interests such as employment, is either 
‘li  invoke the procedural protection of the Due 
Pr
. 
ection 851.8 petitioner, as the due 
roces forded under the California Constitution recognize interests not safeguarded by 
e federal Due P See Part III.B, supra. 
ibits specified traits).  The Court found that such posting may be interpreted by some to be 
“merely the mark of illness, [but] to others it is a stigma, an official branding of a person.” Id. at 437. 
 235 Id. at 437.  It is unlikely that this interest continues to suffice as a trigger for federal due 
berty’ or ‘property’ by itself sufficient to
ocess Clause. 
Id
  This lack of federal recognition is not fatal to the s
p s protections af
rocess Clause.  th
 236 DiFilippo, supra note 1. 
 237 Id. 
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le, if any, 
probative value in showing that he has engaged in any misconduct.”242  
The court acknowledged conceivable legitimate purposes for police use 
rd of an arrest resulting in 
y “lose any tendency to show probable 
 
death of Daniel Giletta.238  He has applied to numerous jobs, but 
continues to find that “[n]obody wants to hire a killer.”239 
2.  The Burdensome Standard for Sealing an Arrest Creates a Substantial 
Risk that the Arrested Person Will Be Subjected to an Erroneous 
Deprivation of Her Legitimate Interest in Sealing the Arrest Record 
Although the Kenny Woods story seems extraordinary, the 
occurrence of erroneous arrests and police misconduct is undisputed.240  
A substantial likelihood exists that any given arrest record creates a false 
indicator of the arrested person’s culpability.241  Given the questionable 
value of these records for assessing a person’s guilt, a considerable risk 
exists that an arrested person will be erroneously deprived of her 
legitimate interests by the retention and dissemination of the arrest 
record. 
In Utz v. Cullinane, the District of Columbia Circuit discussed the 
feeble constitutional basis for using an arrest record against the arrestee: 
“The mere fact that a man has been arrested has very litt
of “unresolved” arrest records but found no legitimate law enforcement 
purpose in utilizing the record of an arrest that was dismissed or 
abandoned by law enforcement, or the reco
acquittal.243  Stating that the
cause,” the Cullinane court characterized such arrest records as no more 
than “gutter rumors when measured against any standards of 
constitutional fairness to an individual.”244  Finally, the court recognized 
the danger of attaching probative value to records that are based on 
criminal accusations untested by the procedural safeguards inherent in 
constitutional criminal justice proceedings.245 
 
 238 Id. 
 239 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 240 See supra Part I.A. 
 241 See discussion supra Part I. 
 242 Utz v. Cullinane, 520 F.2d 467, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
 243 Id. at 479. 
 244 Id. 
 245 Id. at 478 (“In our constitutional scheme, we operate under the salutary principle that an 
individual is presumed innocent of the charges of which he . . . stands accused unless he is found 
guilty via a process replete with substantial procedural safeguards. An arrest record, without more, is 
a fact which is absolutely irrelevant to the question of an individual’s guilt.” (footnote omitted)). 
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ing 
against erroneously depriving a section 851.8 petitioner of her interests 
ion 
bel ks and their covers, a statute should not be 
judged on its face.  In practice, section 851.8 denies due process by 
mand
 
Against this infirm framework, sealing and destruction of the arrest 
record under section 851.8 is often the arrestee’s sole remedy.  To avoid 
retention and dissemination of the arrest information, the arrested person 
may petition the court to seal and destroy the record.246  The existence of 
this remedy is itself a recognition of the arrested person’s legitimate 
interests.  Moreover, the statutory provision for a full hearing on the 
merits of the petition appears to be motivated by the goal of safeguard
in sealing the arrest record.247 
This opportunity for a full hearing on the section 851.8 petit
ies the notion that, like boo
ating that an arrested person prove her factual innocence of the 
charges before the record will be sealed and destroyed.248  By imposing 
this substantial burden on the section 851.8 petitioner, the statute ensures 
that successful petitions under its purview are “rare” and that most 
arrested persons will be barred from its remedy.249  This reality is 
augmented by the judiciary’s rigorous application of the section 851.8 
standard,250 police resistance to section 851.8 petitions,251 and the lack of 
awareness amongst eligible persons that this remedy exists.252 
 
 246 See generally CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8 (Westlaw 2013).  For a detailed account of the 
section
articles.latimes.com/2002/oct/09/local/me-childs9 (“Such petitions are rare . . . and typically pursued 
in cases in which a victim recants or other evidence clears the accused of wrongdoing.”); Leipold, 
supra note 13, at 1324-25 (2000) (“California imposes a nearly-prohibitive burden of proof on the 
defendant. The requirement that defendant prove ‘no reasonable cause’ to believe that he committed 
e report. 
pecially the case when the alleged 
rimin ement agencies typically ignore section 
51.8 p s.  Dinday, supra note 125. 
rest will be reflected on their records and 
naware of the section 851.8 remedy.  Interview with Meredith Desautels, supra note 
15; s  Ct. App. Nov. 2, 2012) 
 851.8 procedures, see supra Part II.A. 
 247 CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8(b), (c) (Westlaw 2013). 
 248 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 249 See Tracey Kaplan, Young Man Found “Factually Innocent” of Felony Charges, SILICON 
VALLEY MERCURY NEWS, Aug. 20, 2009, available at www.mercurynews.com/topstories/ci_ 
13163390 (“Findings of factual innocence are rare, even when charges are dropped.”); Tracy 
Wilson, Acquitted Pair Seek To Clear Names, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2002, 
the crime has been applied rigorously, and as a result, relatively few acquitted defendants even 
attempt to take advantage of the procedure.”). 
 250 See  supra Part II.B–C; Leipold, supra note 13, at 1324-25 (“The requirement that 
defendant prove ‘no reasonable cause’ to believe that he committed the crime has been applied 
rigorously, and as a result, relatively few acquitted defendants even attempt to take advantage of the 
procedure.”). 
 251 It is very difficult to win a section 851.8 petition without submitting the police report as 
evidence, and some petitioners have encountered police resistance to providing a copy of th
Interview with Meredith Desautels, supra note 115.  This is es
c offense involved a victim. Id.  Moreover, law enforcal 
8 etition
 252 Many arrested persons are unaware that the ar
likewise are u
1 ee also People v. Collins, No. A132034, 2012 WL 5378649, *3 (Cal.
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mption of innocence.  
rse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man 
go free.”  
inal 
cha  arrest 
rec  despite 
the fact that guilt was not constitutionally established.”   Such a scheme 
 
 
This ostensible opportunity to challenge the government’s 
deprivatory action lacks the meaning required by Ramirez.253  
Accordingly, state due process asks if any probable value exists in 
additional or substitute safeguards.254  Fortunately, an additional 
safeguard readily exists in the current structure of the criminal justice 
system—the safeguard that protects the arrested person’s dignitary 
interest in her constitutional right to the presu 255
3.  The Arrested Person’s Dignitary Interest in Due Process Protection 
Requires Modification of the Section 851.8 Standard To Seal and 
Destroy an Arrest Record 
Underpinning our nation’s identity is the principle that 
“presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, 
axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of 
the administration of our criminal law.”256  This societal value can be 
traced back to “Deuteronomy through Roman law, English common law, 
and the common law of the United States.”257  In practice, the 
presumption of innocence operates through the guarantee that an accused 
citizen may be found guilty of a crime only by proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.258  This guarantee reflects a fundamental principle in our society 
that “it is far wo
259
Although an arrested person has not been convicted of the crim
rge, the government’s subsequent use and dissemination of an
ord “effectively permits the government to inflict punishment
260
(noting that the section 851.8 petitioner argued that his petition was delayed because of his ignorance 
regarding the existence of the arrest record and the statutory remedy: “I get out, and I had no idea 
that this was still on my record, and I tried to find out how to get it out. . . . I just recently discovered 
this 851.8 a few months ago on my own, and that’s when I first came to the court . . . .” (quoting 
petitioner)). 
nst him.”); People v. 
rcig 1, 618 (Ct. App. 1986) (stating that Ramirez required that the defendant be 
rovid
 253 See Mohilef v. Janovici, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 724 (Ct. App. 1996) (“We hold that due 
process is satisfied as long as the property owner receives adequate notice of the nature of the 
meaningful opportunity to respond to the charges agaialleged nuisance and a 
A 27 Cal. Rptr. 61a, 2
p  a meaningful oppored tunity to respond to the grounds for exclusion from the CRC). 
 254 People v. Ramirez, 599 P.2d 622, 627-28 (Cal. 1979). 
 255 Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895). 
 256 Id. 
 257 Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 483 (1978). 
 258 Id. 
 259 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 260 Utz v. Cullinane, 520 F.2d 467, 481 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
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al, the government abandons the “proper 
forum
e arrested person’s interest may be safeguarded against 
impr
d the court 
would be the final arbiter of justice.  Moreover, this suggested inversion 
 
indi d the 
gove 4 
4.  A
The California Legislature enacted section 851.8 to protect against 
the danger that an innocent person may be wrongfully arrested for a 
 
offends the notion that the government bears the burden of proving 
criminal culpability.261  By terminating criminal justice proceedings or 
exonerating an individual at tri
” for adjudicating the arrestee’s guilt, and “the Constitution 
requires that he be treated as though he engaged in no criminal 
activity.”262  Under section 851.8, this usual manner of criminal 
proceedings is inverted: the accused bears the burden of proving, beyond 
all doubt, her innocence of the offense. 
Through a simple inversion of the section 851.8 standard and 
procedure, th
oper deprivation.  In those cases where, as the Cullinane court 
illustrated, the government has abandoned pursuit of the charges or the 
arrested person has been acquitted,263 a presumptive right to seal the 
record could be constitutionally founded on the arrested person’s 
legitimate interest in protecting against improper use of her record.  The 
government could rebut this presumptive right through evidence tending 
to show that the State’s interest in retaining the record overrides the 
arrested person’s interest in sealing it.  Such a scheme would eliminate 
the requirement of proving absolute innocence, or guilt, an
of the current statutory scheme would properly account for the
vidual’s dignitary interest in a fair interaction between herself an
rnment.26
n Alternative Standard for Sealing the Arrest Would Further the 
Legislature’s Purpose, and Any Increase in the Government’s 
Administrative Burden Is Appropriate To Rectify the Current 
Imbalance 
crime.265  By creating a presumptive right to an arrest seal for persons 
 
 261 Id. at 479 (noting the conflict between the assumption that arrest records have value for 
law enforcement purposes and the “constitutional presumption of innocence”). 
 262 Id. at 480-81. 
 263 See id. at 479. 
 264 People v. Ramirez, 599 P.2d 622, 627 (Cal. 1979) (“[F]reedom from arbitrary adjudicative 
procedures is a substantive element of one’s liberty”). 
 265 Legis. Counsel’s Digest, Assemb. B. 2861 (1979–1980 Reg. Sess.) 4 Stats. 1980, 
ummS ary Digest 383 1980 Cal. Stat. 1 (“This bill would provide a procedure whereby a person who 
has been arrested or detained and is factually innocent may request a law enforcement agency or the 
court to provide for the sealing and destruction of the arrest record.”), quoted in People v. Bermudez, 
91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 510, 513 (Ct. App. 2009); People v. Glimps, 155 Cal. Rptr. 230, 234-35 (Ct. App. 
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e current procedure under section 851.8 
prov
e arrest record.   
Cons
Over thirty years have passed since the enactment of section 
851.8.268  Despite the statute’s laudable intent to protect the innocent 
accused, the means have clearly failed to live up to that intention.  
Whether the factual innocence standard survives or falters under judicial 
269
 
who were acquitted of the charges or whose charges were dismissed, the 
alternative standard is more likely than the current scheme to further the 
Legislature’s original purpose. 
Furthermore, a modification to the burden and evidentiary standard 
under section 851.8 would not significantly increase the administrative 
burden on the courts.  Th
ides for an adversarial court hearing involving the prosecutor and the 
presentation of evidence.266  Shifting the burden to the government 
would merely place the onus on the prosecutor to pursue only cases of 
true interest. 
The creation of a presumptive right to an arrest seal may result in an 
increased administrative burden on law enforcement agencies and courts 
to initiate procedures to regularly expunge arrest records.  Ramirez 
requires that any such increased administrative burden be weighed 
against the private interest in sealing and destroying th 267
titutional due process mandates that the government, not the 
arrestee, bear the burden of proof.  Accordingly, any increased 
administrative burden would be necessary and justified to appropriately 
rectify the unconstitutional imbalance of the current scheme. 
IV.  THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE SHOULD AMEND SECTION 851.8 TO 
MIRROR THE STATE’S ENLIGHTENED APPROACH TO CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 
review,  the interests of justice call for a change to section 851.8.  This 
 
1979); see also People v. Adair, 62 P.3d 45, 51 (Cal. 2003) (“Section 851.8 is for the benefit of those 
defendants who have not committed a crime. It permits those petitioners who can show that the state 
should never have subjected them to the compulsion of the criminal law—because no objective 
ctor h action.”). 
In People v. 
mir
fa s justified official action—to purge the official records of any reference to suc
 266 CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8(b), (c) (Westlaw 2013). 
 267 Ramirez, 599 P.2d at 627; Van Atta v. Scott, 613 P.2d 210, 214 (Cal. 1980) (“
Ra ez, this court held that the extent to which procedural due process relief is available under the 
California Constitution depends on a careful weighing of the private and governmental interests 
involved.” (citation omitted)); see also San Jose Police Officers Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 245 Cal. 
Rptr. 729, 732 (Ct. App. 1988) (“Ramirez does not purport to require any particular level of 
procedural safeguards in any particular case. . . . [T]he level of procedural protection varies with the 
terein sts at stake, considered according to the balancing formula set out in Ramirez.”). 
 268 CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8 (Westlaw 2013) (enacted in 1980). 
 269 Indeed, as outlined in this Comment, the courts have steadfastly interpreted section 851.8 
so narrowly as to effectively bar individuals from its remedy. See supra notes 164-173 and 
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e state’s criminal record 
database for a lifetime of future uses.  It arises from the reality that 
rdensome standard on arrested persons means, in effect, 
inflicting an additional hardship on those minority communities that 
alrea
the legitimate 
interests of accused persons who have not been convicted of a crime.  In 
initiating such a shift, California would not be alone—other states 
already recognize the limited value of an arrest record in assessing a 
person’s culpability.273  In Maryland, for instance, a recently enacted 
statute provides that a court “shall” grant an arrestee’s petition to 
expunge the arrest record, unless the prosecutor objects within thirty 
days of the petition.274  This approach places the burden on the state to 
 
 
call arises from the thousands of persons who are arrested every year and 
whose arrest records are subsequently entered th
imposing a bu
dy face an uphill battle. 
Moreover, this is a time of evolution in California’s criminal justice 
regime.  California State Attorney General Kamala Harris recently 
stated, “There seem to be two positions for DAs and AGs to take: tough 
on crime and soft on crime.  I believe there’s a third way forward: smart 
on crime.”270  This comment was made in the midst of a campaign to win 
support for A.B. 109, the criminal justice realignment bill.271  
California’s realignment signals a “landmark transition from a 
generation’s worth of tough-on-crime policies to a new, less expensive, 
more enlightened and more effective . . . approach.”272 
This shift toward a more enlightened criminal justice approach 
should involve a concomitant shift toward acknowledging 
accompanying text.  Given this history, it is unlikely that the courts will reverse direction. See 
People v. Scott M., 213 Cal. Rptr. 456, 463 (Ct. App. 1985) (“If the Legislature had wanted to treat a 
verdict of acquittal as some sort of rebuttable presumption of factual innocence it could easily have 
so provided. Only in those cases where the defendant is actually innocent is the trial court justified in 
sealing and destroying a defendant’s arrest records.”), disapproved on other grounds by Adair, 62 
P.3d at 53 n.6. 
 270 Sharon Driscoll, California Attorney General Kamala Harris Gives Public Talk at 
Stanford Law School, STAN. REP., Oct. 31, 2011, news.stanford.edu/news/2011/october/kamala-
harris-law-103111.html. 
 271 Id.; see also Criminal Justice Realignment, Assemb. B. 109 (Cal. 2011). 
 272 Editorial, Get Ready, California Counties, Here Come the Inmates, L.A TIMES, Aug. 30, 
2011, available at articles.latimes.com/2011/aug/30/realestate/la-ed-re-entry-20110830. 
 273 ALICE KING, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTION 11, 14 (2007), 
available at nyls.edu/user_files/1/3/4/30/59/65/68/capstone060704.pdf (noting that “Pennsylvania 
does not report arrests more than three years old where there was no conviction and there are no 
pending proceedings” and New York bars “most private and public employers and occupational 
licensing authorities [from asking] about arrests that did not lead to conviction”). 
 274 MD. CODE. ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 10-105(d)(2) (Westlaw 2013); see also James Drew, A 
hanc .baltimoresun.com/2008-07-
7/new rest-records (“Thousands of Marylanders 
C e for a Clean Slate, BALT. SUN, July 7, 2008, available at articles
0 s/0807060265_1_expungement-criminal-record-ar
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oppose the petition, after which the court must hold a hearing to 
determine whether to grant the expungement.275 
CONCLUSION 
If California is to follow the constitutional dictate that a person be 
presumed innocent until proven guilty, section 851.8 of the Penal Code 
must be changed.  It is unacceptable to bestow a lifetime brand of 
suspicion on an individual based on an arrest that did not lead to a 
conviction, without giving the arrestee a reasonable opportunity to be 
heard.  This injustice is compounded by the reality that minority 
communities are policed in California at rates greatly disproportionate to 
their rate of culpability.276  Whether effected through the judicial or 
legislative process, California must change section 851.8 to more 
accurately reflect the longstanding principle—the “bedrock” of our 
criminal justice system—that we presume the innocence of persons who 
have not been found guilty beyond all reasonable doubt.277 
 
 
have had their arrest records removed from public view because of a new state law that requires 
automatic expungement for those who are detained and released without charge.”). 
 275 MD. CODE. ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 10-105(e) (Westlaw 2013). 
 276 See supra notes 43-58 and accompanying text. 
 277 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970). 
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